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I examine the influence of labor, debtholders, and customers on the determinants of
voluntary, stand-alone CSR report initiation. Exploring the influence of these stakeholder
groups expands our understanding of how the demand for voluntary non-financial
disclosure, embodied by CSR reporting, arises and provides a model to reduce selection
bias in future CSR studies. I expect that CSR reports are relevant to employees who
possess unemployment aversion and debtholders mindful of default risk. Consequently,
when these stakeholders are more influential at a given firm, there should be a greater
propensity to disclose CSR activities. Further, I posit that there can be an interactive
effect between these two stakeholder groups on the propensity to disclose. Consistent
with my predictions, I find firms with high labor pressure, a high degree of leverage, and
greater advertising intensity are more likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities. I also
find the odds of CSR reporting are statistically higher as leverage increases in a sample
with high labor pressure, as compared to a sample with low labor pressure. My findings
suggest labor and debtholders influence voluntary CSR reporting and also that laborrelated capital structure strategy influences voluntary non-financial disclosure activity.
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I. Introduction
Despite the increasing frequency of voluntary corporate social responsibility
(CSR) disclosures, the current literature provides limited information on what motivates a
firm’s CSR disclosure decision (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011). In this study, I
examine the influence of labor, debtholders, and customers on determinants of voluntary,
stand-alone CSR disclosures (reports) in order to expand our understanding of how the
demand for voluntary non-financial disclosure arises and the influence of productionrelated frictions and capital structure strategy on firms’ voluntary disclosure activities.
CSR reports are internally generated documents that outline economic,
environmental, and social policies; actions; and commitments of the firm to
stakeholders.1 The number of publicly traded United States (US) firms issuing standalone CSR reports is relatively small – approximately 400 firms in 2012, corresponding
to five percent of firms listed in Compustat’s North America Fundamentals Annual – but
CSR reporters represent 51 percent of the S&P 500. Although there are fewer CSR
issuances in the US than abroad, CSR reports have been increasing in frequency in the
last decade. Since 2002, CorporateRegister.com reports a 353 and 333 percent increase in
domestic and global CSR reporting, respectively.2
With an emphasis on shareholder-value impact, the extant accounting literature
finds CSR reporting is associated with better analyst coverage (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan,
Tsang, and Yang 2012), an increase in institutional investors (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), a
reduction in firms’ cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), higher earnings quality
(Kim, Park, and Wier 2012), tax avoidance (Watson 2015), and positive reputational
1

An outline of recommended content for CSR reports can be found in Appendix 1.
This trend is easily seen in Figure 1, which depicts the annual issuance of all CSR reports from 2002 to 2012 for US
(Figure 1A) and global (Figure 1B) firms.
2
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effects (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011;
Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Although shareholder-value of CSR has been documented, CSR
reports contain information directly related to, and often targeting, many stakeholders
(Boston College 2010). There is little evidence regarding the usefulness of reporting to
stakeholders (Healy and Palepu 2001), but CSR reports represent a unique setting in
which to further explore the influence of several stakeholder groups on voluntary
disclosure activities.
The first stakeholder group I examine is labor. Employees apply economic, social,
and regulatory pressure on the firm. Although the strength of individual employees varies
from firm to firm, prior research finds that when employees unionize, their collective
bargaining power can influence compensation (Matsa 2010), accounting choice
(D’Souza, Jacob, and Ramesh 2001), tax aggressiveness (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui
2013), equity value of the firm (Lee and Mas 2012), and influence firms to miss mean
consensus analysts’ estimates (Bova 2013). The extant literature examining the
relationship between unionized employees and voluntary disclosure suggests
management is incentivized to remain opaque when facing strong labor (Depoers 2000;
Hilary 2006; Bova 2013). These studies suggest unionized employees use voluntary
disclosures to extract above-market rents during the collective bargaining process,
encouraging firms with strong employee stakeholders to decrease voluntary disclosures in
order to maintain their bargaining position.
I build on economic theory advocating that given the cost of unemployment,
workers require compensation in the form of higher wages, additional benefits, or
improved working conditions to compensate for unemployment risk (Matsa 2010). Labor
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unions bargain for groups of workers collectively and seek to maximize employee
compensation functions to offset unemployment risk, but Leap (1991) finds that unions
generally do not have access to an employer’s production, financial, or personnel
information.3 I suggest that voluntary disclosures represent a vehicle for the firm to
communicate unemployment risk offsets. Unlike financial disclosures examined by prior
studies, voluntary CSR reports provide firm-wide, labor-specific information, which may
include: employee diversification statistics; training and education information; ethics
policies; benefits; and volunteerism.4 Global Reporting Index guidelines also suggest
CSR reports contain disclosures on the sustainability of the firm. With employee-specific
content, CSR disclosures should represent an opportunity for firms to offset informational
demands of labor unions and mitigate unemployment risk by disclosing non-financial
personnel information, providing a long-term outlook for the firm, and disclosing
information on employee benefits and working conditions. Given the content and longterm outlook of voluntary CSR disclosures, I posit that CSR reports are relevant to
employees who possess unemployment aversion. In contrast to prior research that finds
bargaining pressure from unionized employees decreases voluntary disclosure, I expect
that firms facing strong labor pressure are more likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone
CSR reports than their counterparts.
The second stakeholder group I examine in this study is debtholders. Extant
accounting research finds that voluntary disclosures can be used to decrease the
perception of default risk (Sengupta 1998), and studies by Weber, Scholz, and Michalik
The National Labor Relations Board requires “good faith” collective bargaining. Unions must request desired
information and that information must be relevant to the bargaining process as well as not “unduly burdensome” to
furnish. Typical information requests include employee wage information, benefits information, and terms/conditions
of employment.
4 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) includes CSR disclosure guidelines for both labor and human rights. For more
details on these suggested disclosures, see Appendix 1.
3
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(2010) and Weber (2012) suggest social and environmental risks are relevant components
in debtholder assessment of default risk. Although CSR disclosures, which provide a
long-term outlook and contain both social and environmental content, appear to be a tool
for default risk management, the debtholder-specific CSR literature focuses on
consequences of CSR performance rather than debt as a determinant of voluntary, standalone CSR disclosure. In the finance literature, Goss and Roberts (2011) note firms with
CSR concerns pay 7 to 18 basis points more on private loans, but they find no evidence
that lenders reward CSR performance. Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh (2013) use a
similar measure of CSR performance and find credit rating agencies tend to award
relatively high ratings to firms with good CSR performance. Little is known about what
drives the limited debt-CSR findings, but in effort to shed light on these results, I
examine the influence of debt on the likelihood of a firm to initiate voluntary, stand-alone
CSR reporting. Voluntary CSR disclosures should represent an opportunity for firms to
signal a long-term outlook and address environmental and social risks embedded in
default calculations. Therefore, I posit that firms facing high levels of debt in their capital
structure are more likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than their
counterparts.
Additionally, I consider how market frictions between stakeholders influence
capital structure and voluntary disclosure activities. Graham and Leary (2011) note that
the incentive effects of capital structure can affect contracting between the firm and nonfinancial stakeholders, including employees. The relationship between debt and employee
stakeholders is further examined by Matsa (2010) who finds that for an additional 10
percent unionization, a firm is likely to experience approximately a 100 basis point
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increase in leverage. Matsa suggests firms facing unionization take on debt as an eventual
bargaining device. As a consequence of increasing leverage, the firm increases default
risk and debt servicing, simultaneously moderating employee access to free cash flows
and increasing unemployment risk. This capital structure strategy does not reduce
employee demand for relief from unemployment risk, but it does limit employee access
to pecuniary compensation. Given the content of CSR reports, I posit that firms engaging
in capital structure strategy related to labor frictions are more likely to engage in
voluntary CSR reporting as a form of non-pecuniary compensation used to offset higher
levels of unemployment risk. Interacting debt and employee stakeholder characteristics
provides a better understanding of the determinants of voluntary, stand-alone CSR
reporting in a firm with complex, production-related market frictions.
Finally, I examine the influence of customers on voluntary CSR reporting. The
CSR reports examined in this study are professional, stand-alone documents released by
firms to the public and easily interpreted as marketing tools. Emphasizing the importance
of customer stakeholders on CSR reporting, marketing literature finds that CSR reports
have a positive impact on global brand equity, awareness, image, credibility, and
engagement (Hoeffler and Keller 2002; Torres, Bijmolt, Tribó, and Verhoef 2012).
However, customer influence on CSR reporting is uncertain as research in marketing also
suggests that CSR can lead to higher levels of perceived hypocrisy and negative
reputation, with customers believing that CSR reports are used only to further the selfinterest of the company (Knight and Greenberg 2002; Prout 2006; Wagner, Lutz, and
Weitz 2009).

5

I empirically examine the influence of labor, debtholders, capital structure, and
customers on CSR activities between the years 2002 and 2012 by using CSR report data
from CorporateRegister.com and unionization data from the Union Membership and
Coverage Database. CSR reporting is voluntary and unregulated. As firms are not
required to consistently issue CSR reports, I examine the decision to initiate voluntary,
stand-alone CSR reporting. Labor pressure is used to proxy for the influence of labor on
voluntary disclosure decisions. Labor pressure is a measure of employee bargaining
power with the firm and a function of the percentage of employees participating in
collective bargaining (the unionization rate) as well as the importance of employees to
the production function of the firm (the labor to capital ratio). The unionization rate is
provided by the Union Membership and Coverage Database and the labor to capital ratio
is employees to total assets (Hilary 2006; Chen, Chen, and Liao 2011; Chen, Chen, and
Wang 2012).5 A firm-specific leverage ratio is used to proxy for the influence of
debtholders and customer influence on CSR activities is measured via advertising
intensity, the ratio of reported annual advertising expense divided by average total assets
(Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Casey and Grenier 2014).
I find firms with high labor pressure and firms with a high degree of leverage in
the prior year are more likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year.
This is consistent with CSR reporting mitigating unemployment risk and default risk.
Further, interacting leverage and labor pressure, I find that the effect of debt in a firm’s
capital structure on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting is greater at higher
levels of labor pressure. This suggests firms with both high labor pressure and high levels
of debt in their capital structure are more likely to initiate CSR disclosures. Partitioning
5

For a more detailed description of the labor pressure variable, see Appendix 2.
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the sample into high and low levels of labor pressure, I find the effect of additional
leverage on the firm’s likelihood of issuing a CSR report is only significant when
employees exert higher levels of labor pressure. These findings support that labor-related
capital structure strategy influences voluntary disclosure activity.
Prior voluntary disclosure literature emphasizes the relationship between equity
drivers, such as investors and analysts, and management’s propensity to engage in
voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001; Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006; Dhaliwal
et al. 2011). I contribute to the literature, expanding our understanding of how the
demand for voluntary disclosure arises, by considering disclosure frictions and demands
generated by an interactive system of stakeholders. Specifically, I examine the influence
of frictions generated by the firm’s production function on management’s propensity to
issue voluntary CSR disclosure and document the firm-level influence of labor and
capital structure on voluntary disclosure.
I add to the literature regarding organized labor’s influence on voluntary
disclosure, extending the traditional research of Depoers (2000), Hilary (2006), and Bova
(2013) beyond financial disclosure. My findings expand our understanding of labor’s
influence on firm activities, namely voluntary CSR disclosure. I also contribute to the
debt-CSR literature, shedding light on debt as a determinant of voluntary CSR disclosure
and the influence of capital structure policy on voluntary disclosure activity. I show our
understanding of voluntary disclosure is improved by considering the conditional
influences of stakeholders on disclosure decisions. I suggest that capital structure strategy
used to manage labor cost influences debt structure, financial reporting, and also has a
spillover influence on voluntary disclosure, providing an opportunity for future research

7

to examine the spillover effect of stakeholder interactions on voluntary disclosure and
financial reporting. Finally, I contribute to future Corporate Social Responsibility
research by providing a model to control for selection bias related to the CSR disclosure
decision. The model in this paper can be used as the first step in two-staged research
designs considering the consequences of CSR reporting and CSR quality.

II. Hypothesis Development
As more firms issue voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports each
year, research on why these voluntary, non-regulated disclosures are provided continues
to expand. Prior accounting research takes a shareholder-centric approach and focuses on
the benefits of CSR reporting related to decreasing the cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et
al. 2011), improving analyst coverage and forecasts (Dhaliwal et al. 2012), and increasing
institutional investors (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Additional research has also been conducted
on how CSR reporting influences earnings management (Kim et al. 2012), corporate tax
policy (Watson 2015), and the potential reputational benefits of CSR report assurance
(Simnett et al. 2009; Pflugrath et al. 2011). Although the extant research finds equity-side
benefits of CSR reporting, these voluntary disclosures contain a wide array of
stakeholder-specific information, including information relating to: environmental
concerns/strategy, diversity, employee relations, human rights, corporate governance, and
community. The stakeholder information content of stand-alone CSR reports suggests
that shareholder-oriented motivations for CSR reporting are not the complete story.6

6

The most widely used measure of CSR performance, the CSR rating provided by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini
Research & Analytics (KLD), supports the theory that CSR reports are stakeholder oriented. MSCI, the parent
company of KLD, notes its KLD ratings – as seen in Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Goss and Roberts
2011; Attig et al 2013; Kim et al. 2012 – address a company’s environmental, social and governance performance in

8

Both Healy and Palepu (2001) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) note there is little
academic evidence regarding the value of reporting to stakeholders. As voluntary, standalone disclosures with a stakeholder emphasis, CSR reports represent a unique
opportunity to examine the influence of stakeholders on voluntary disclosure and a forum
for future research on the benefits, both financial and managerial, of voluntary
disclosures on stakeholder interaction. The remainder of this section offers a brief review
of stakeholder theory as it relates to CSR reporting, followed by the development of my
hypotheses regarding the relationships between voluntary CSR reporting and labor
pressure and capital structure.

A. Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory suggests that management is influenced not only by the desire
to maximize shareholder wealth, but also by the relationships and contracts of other
parties within the system of the firm. Milton Friedman (1970) wrote that the mere
existence of CSR was a signal of an agency problem within the firm, but Edward
Freeman (1983) cited stakeholder theory to assert that managers must satisfy a variety of
constituents who can influence firm outcomes.
Aguinis and Glavas (2012) review CSR literature from 588 journal articles and
102 books across the fields of management, ethics, marketing, psychology, organizational
behavior, and organizational studies. The authors define CSR as “context-specific
organizational actions and policies that take into account stakeholders’ expectations and
the triple bottom line of economic, social, and environmental performance” (consistent

the context of five categories, covering key corporate stakeholders: environment, community and society, employees
and supply chain, customers and governance and ethics (MSCI Research 2010).
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with Aguinis 2011; Rupp 2011; and Rupp, Williams, and Aguilera 2010). Aguinis and
Glavas (2012) summarize that stakeholders attempting to influence firms to engage in
CSR include: shareholders, consumers, the media, the local community, and interest
groups. Empirically, the management literature finds little evidence to suggest that
managers taking a wider stakeholder view will jeopardize interests of stockholders (Bird,
Hall, Momentè, and Reggianni 2007).
Early accounting studies by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) and Watts and
Zimmerman (1978) posit that management’s accounting choices are systematically
affected by firm contracts. Their theories were empirically examined by Bowen,
DuCharme, and Shores (1995) who find that accounting method choice is influenced by a
range of stakeholders, including: customers, suppliers, employees, and short-term
creditors. Richardson and Welker (2001) examine the relation between financial and
social disclosure and the cost of equity capital for Canadian firms in the early 1990’s. In
concluding their research, the authors proposed that social disclosures might benefit the
firm through their effects on organizational stakeholders other than equity investors.
In 2012, Dhaliwal et al. published an empirical examination of international,
stand-alone CSR reports. The authors do not examine the influence of specific
stakeholders on CSR reporting, but their findings – that the issuance of stand-alone CSR
reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error – are stronger in countries that are
more stakeholder-oriented, where a broad spectrum of stakeholders are seen by society as
possessing a legitimate interest in corporate activities and maximizing shareholder value
is not the only objective of the firm. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) acknowledge that the US is
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not a pure stakeholder country, but they posit, nonetheless, that US media, marketing,
strategy, labor relations, and regulation could relate to CSR.
Like shareholders, debtholders and employees hold contracts with the firm that
arise optimally in response to particular market frictions. Unlike shareholders who are
exposed to upside risk, debtholders and employees are, respectively, more sensitive to
default risk and unemployment risk. Exploring the influence of labor and debtholders
expands our understanding of how the demand for voluntary non-financial disclosure,
embodied by CSR reporting, arises and provides a foundation for future examination of
the full economic costs and benefits of CSR reporting.

B. Labor Pressure
Employees act as both a claimant on firm cash flows and a component of the
firm’s production function. Labor also applies economic pressure via compensation and
tax compliance, social pressure through community and reputation, and regulatory
pressure from government agencies such as the United States Department of Labor. The
influence of employees as a stakeholder group varies from firm to firm, industry to
industry, but when employees elect to bargain collectively for wages and benefits, the
extant literature suggests that employees recognize positive gains in bargaining power
and the ability to exert economic pressure on management and other stakeholders,
hereafter referred to as “labor pressure”.7 Labor pressure has been found to influence
accounting choice (D’Souza et al. 2001), tax aggressiveness (Chyz et al. 2013), equity

7

Labor pressure is, hereafter, defined as the economic influence of employees on the firm. I consider the social and
regulatory pressure in additional analysis found in Section V, Part D.
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value of the firm (Lee and Mas 2012), and management’s incentive to signal a negative
outlook (Bova 2013).
The extant literature examining the relationship between unionized employees
and voluntary disclosure suggests management is incentivized to remain opaque when
facing strong labor. Reynolds, Masters, and Moser (1998) and Kleiner and Bouillon
(1988) note that firm disclosures – such as: financial condition, productivity, future
investments, and relative wages – increase wages and benefits for employees. The
authors suggest that information sharing on the part of the firm increases bargaining
power for American unions. Reynolds et al. (1998) find firms with organized labor are
incentivized to hoard information in order to maintain bargaining power with unions.
These findings are consistent with Depoers (2000), who examined voluntary disclosures
in French firms and found that as labor pressure increases, voluntary disclosure
decreases.
Hilary (2006) regressed bid-ask spreads and analyst coverage against a measure
of labor pressure. Although the author does not examine raw disclosures, he suggests
collective bargaining creates information asymmetry in the financial markets and can
have negative effects on firm disclosure. Bova (2013) examines 103 firms with collective
bargaining contracts and finds unionized firms are more likely than a non-unionized
control group to miss mean consensus analysts’ earnings forecast. Further, the author
suggests unionized firms appear to signal a negative outlook regardless of when
collective bargaining agreement negotiations take place. The author’s results are
consistent with the hypothesis that managers of unionized firms seek to manipulate
information signals when contracting with unionized employees.

12

Prior studies suggest unionized employees use voluntary disclosures to extract
above-market rents during the collective bargaining process, encouraging firms with
strong employee stakeholders to decrease voluntary disclosures. I add to the literature
regarding organized labor’s influence on voluntary disclosure, extending the traditional
research of Depoers (2000), Hilary (2006), and Bova (2013) beyond financial disclosure.
Unlike shareholders, who face little downside risk other than the loss of their
individual investments, employees are exposed to job loss (unemployment risk) in the
event of firm termination. Matsa (2010) suggests that given the cost of unemployment,
workers require compensation in the form of higher wages, additional benefits, or
improved working conditions to compensate for unemployment risk. Representing groups
of workers, labor unions seek to maximize employee compensation functions to offset
unemployment risk. The extant economic literature finds unionized employees exert
greater compensation pressure than their non-unionized counterparts, historically
garnering premiums between 13 and 22 percent (Bratsburg and Ragan 2002).
Furthermore, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2012 Union Members report notes
unionized employees have median usual weekly earnings that are 27 percent higher than
those who were not union members (2013).
To maximize compensation, unionized employees engage in collective bargaining
with the firm. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) requires “good faith”
collective bargaining between labor unions and employees. In seeking information to
improve their bargaining position, unions are entitled to make information requests of the
firm, but that information must be relevant to the bargaining process as well as not
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unduly burdensome to furnish.8 Despite the informational provisions of collective
bargaining, Leap (1991) argues that unions generally do not have access to an employer’s
production, financial, or personnel information.
Prior research focuses on the relationship between voluntary financial disclosure
and unionized employees. Unlike financial disclosures examined by prior studies,
voluntary CSR reports provide firm-wide, employee-specific information, which may
include: employee diversification statistics, training and education information, ethics
policies, benefits, and volunteerism.9 With employee-specific content, CSR disclosures
should represent an opportunity for firms to offset informational demands of labor unions
and mitigate unemployment risk by disclosing non-financial personnel information,
providing a long-term outlook for the firm, and disclosing information on employee
benefits and working conditions.
Although prior research finds bargaining pressure from unionized employees
decreases voluntary disclosure, I suggest that voluntary CSR disclosures can be used to
mitigate unemployment risk and firms facing strong labor pressure are more likely to
issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than their counterparts:

The concept “relevant to the bargaining process” is important as some firms engage in collective bargaining with
more than one unit of unionized employees. The Boeing Company, for example, discloses in their 2011 Form 10-K that
they have principal collective bargaining agreements with: The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (IAM), The Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), and The United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Boeing bargains with each labor
union individually and is incentivized to maintain high levels of information asymmetry in order to improve their
bargaining position with each unit.
9 CSR reports and their content are voluntary and unregulated. As such, disclosures vary from firm to firm. As of 2012,
approximately 50% of all US CSR reporters adhered to the CSR content guidelines issued by the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI). An outline of CSR content per the GRI index can be found in Appendix 1.
8
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H1:

The likelihood that a firm will initiate voluntary, stand-alone corporate social
responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the firm’s prior year labor
pressure.

C. Capital Structure
The extant accounting literature generally examines voluntary CSR initiation
from a shareholder perspective. Unlike shareholders, debtholders are highly sensitive to
downside risk – the likelihood a firm terminates or files for bankruptcy. Prior research
suggests CSR activity helps mitigate debtholder exposure to downside risk, specifically
default risk (Sharfman and Fernando 2008; Attig et al. 2013; Weber et al. 2010; Weber
2012), but the extant literature focuses on the consequences of CSR performance on
capital structure rather than the influence of debt as a determinant of voluntary CSR
reporting.
Goss and Roberts (2011) examine private loans between 1996 and 2006 and find
firms with CSR concerns pay 7 to 18 basis points more on private loans. However, using
a modified KLD score of CSR performance, they find no evidence that private lenders
reward CSR investment. Also utilizing a modified KLD score, Attig et al. (2013) find
credit rating agencies tend to award relatively high ratings to firms with good CSR. The
authors examine long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard & Poor’s for 1,585
unique firms over the period 1991 to 2010. Attig et al. (2013) posit that credit analysts
view CSR activities favorably in their rating decision because the resulting improvements
in long-term sustainability decrease the probability of default risk.
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Both Goss and Roberts (2011) and Attig et al. (2013) examine the relationship
between CSR performance and debtholders, where CSR performance is measured using
an external rating of CSR activity – the KLD assessment of CSR performance.10 I
contribute to the debt-CSR literature by examining the influence of debtholders on the
propensity for raw voluntary non-financial disclosure, embodied by CSR reporting. I
build from the extant research which finds that voluntary disclosures can be used to
decrease the perception of default risk (Sengupta 1998) and bank surveys conducted by
Weber et al. (2010) and Weber (2012) finding social and environmental risks are relevant
components in debtholder assessment of default risk. I focus not on the ability of CSR
performance to mitigate default risk, but the ability of voluntary CSR disclosures to
provide a long-term outlook as well as social and environmental information relevant to
debtholders. Given the inferences above, I suggest that firms facing high levels of debt in
their capital structure are more likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than
their counterparts:

H2:

The likelihood that a firm will initiate voluntary, stand-alone corporate social
responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the level of debt in the
firm’s prior year capital structure.

10

MSCI ESG Research acquired KLD Research & Analytics Inc. and is the current compiler of the MSCI ESG Stats
database, formerly known as the KLD database. The database includes environmental, social and governance
performance indicators for the largest 3,000 US companies since 2003, the largest 1,000 companies since 2001, and for
approximately 650 companies every year back to 1991. KLD data are widely used in CSR studies.
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D. Labor Pressure and Capital Structure
In developing Hypotheses 1 and 2, I consider the independent influence of
employee and debt stakeholders on the likelihood of the firm initiating voluntary CSR
disclosures. But both the economic and finance literature suggests labor and
unemployment risk impact corporate financing decisions (Berk, Stanton, and Zechner
2010; Graham and Leary 2011; Agrawal and Matsa 2013) and corporate financing
decisions impact collective bargaining positions with unionized labor (Brander and Lewis
1986; Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriquez 2012; Matsa 2010). Further, classical
economic theory suggests the production function of a firm requires both labor (human
capital) and capital (financial capital). As such, I consider the interactive influence of
labor and debt on voluntary, stand-alone CSR disclosure.
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) suggest unemployment risk associated with human
capital influences financial policies and capital structure. The authors examine the impact
of unemployment risk on financing decisions and find declining unemployment risk
(increases in legally mandated unemployment benefits), leads to increases in corporate
leverage. When examining the relationship between labor and capital structure, other
studies focus on unemployment risk associated with bankruptcy. Graham and Leary
(2011) review empirical capital structure research, noting leverage increases risk for
employee stakeholders who are exposed to unemployment risk in the event of
bankruptcy.
In the extant finance literature, Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) examine the
relationships between capital structure, human capital, and bankruptcy. Building from
economic insights, the authors derive an optimal compensation contract for firms with
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access to both equity and debt. In this setting, Berk et al. (2010) find that if the firm
cannot make interest payments at the contracted wage level, the employee takes a
temporary pay cut to ensure full payment of the debt and persistence of the firm. The
findings suggest employees are sensitive to capital structure. Berk et al. (2010) go on to
examine the impact of bankruptcy on employees. The authors note that in bankruptcy,
firms can abrogate contracts and employees can be terminated and replaced with more
productive employees. Berk et al. (2010) suggest that entrenched employees face
substantial costs from bankruptcy filings – specifically, in the event of bankruptcy, these
employees will be forced to take a wage cut and earn a current market wage. The authors
posit that, ceteris paribus, higher leverage should be associated with higher wages to
offset bankruptcy risks. As previously noted, unionized employees enjoy a strong wage
premium relative to non-unionized employees. Building on the theories of Berk et al.
(2010), unionized employees, therefore, are likely to be more sensitive to default risk due
to the exposure to both wage premium loss and unemployment.
Employee sensitivity to default risk describes only one piece of the labor and
capital structure relationship. Similar to Berk et al. (2010), Brander and Lewis (1986)
suggest firms with substantial debt can argue employees must take a pay cut to help the
firm avoid (emerge from) financial distress. The authors then go on to suggest
management can use debt as a negotiating tool with employees. Matsa (2010) builds on
these studies and finds for an additional 10 percent unionization, a firm is likely to
experience approximately a 100 basis point increase in the debt ratio. Matsa (2010)
suggests firms facing unionization take on debt as an eventual bargaining device to
mitigate wage premiums associated with collective bargaining. Benmelech et al. (2012)
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examine collective bargaining specifically within the airline industry during periods of
financial distress. The authors find, in periods of distress, airlines are able to obtain wage
concessions from employees whose pension plans are underfunded. Their findings are
consistent with the theory that default risk plays an important role in collective
bargaining.
The down side to firms strategically using debt as a bargaining shield is that
increasing debt ratios enough to shield cash flows from employees also increases default
risk and debt servicing while simultaneously moderating employee access to free cash
flows and increasing unemployment risk. This capital structure strategy does not reduce
employee demand for relief from unemployment risk, but it does limit employee access
to pecuniary compensation. Although constrained with respect to wage maximization in
the face of a highly levered firm, where financial resources are more likely to be
prioritized to debt, the objective of the labor union remains - mitigate unemployment risk
by maximizing the components of compensation. Restraint of firm financial resources
therefore shifts labor pressure to non-wage compensation, such as additional benefits or
improved working conditions. Given the content of CSR reports, I posit that firms
engaging in capital structure strategy related to labor frictions are more likely to engage
in voluntary CSR reporting as a form of non-pecuniary compensation used to offset
higher levels of unemployment risk. Therefore, I suggest that firms facing simultaneously
high levels of labor pressure and high levels of debt in their capital structure are more
likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than their counterparts:
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H3:

The effect of debt in the prior year’s capital structure of the firm on the likelihood
of a firm to initiate CSR reporting is greater at higher levels of labor pressure.

E. Customer Influence
In this study, customer focus is management’s awareness and perceived
importance of the firm’s customer constituency. Customers are a significant stakeholder
group and many firms invest heavily in relationship marketing to create, sustain, and
enhance close relationships with their customers, assuming such investments lead to
positive financial outcomes (Mende, Bolton and Bitner 2013). For over a decade,
marketing research has been investigating the relationship and value of environmental
and social disclosures with respect to customer stakeholders.
Building from prior branding literature, Hoeffler and Keller (2002) posit that
corporate social marketing can enhance customer brand metrics, including equity,
awareness, image, credibility, feelings, a sense of community, and engagement. Werther
and Chandler (2005) suggest that customer loyalty is connected to CSR, which acts as
implicit brand insurance. The authors state that the linkage between stakeholders and
brands is the purpose of branding. As the value of the relationship grows, so does the
strategic importance of CSR, which represents conflict prevention between customers
and the firm and can be thought of as modern day boiler insurance (Werther and
Chandler 2005).
CSR and customer relationships have also been empirically examined in the
marketing literature. Torres et al. (2012) examine 57 global brands from 2002 to 2008
and find that CSR reporting targeting stakeholders (customers, shareholders, employees,
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suppliers, and community) has a positive impact on global brand equity. Luo and
Bhattacharya (2006) also conduct an empirical examination of the relationship between
CSR and customer stakeholders. The authors examine under what conditions CSR results
in positive financial performance. Luo and Bhattacharya find CSR reports are associated
with market value, but customer satisfaction partially mediates this relationship. The
authors also find that in firms with low innovativeness capability, CSR actually reduces
customer satisfaction levels and, through lowered satisfaction, harms market value – a
function they refer to as “the dark side of CSR”.
Wagner et al. (2009) describe CSR activities as proactive and reactive. They find
proactive communication strategy (when the firm’s CSR statements precede conflicting
observed behavior) leads to higher levels of perceived hypocrisy than a reactive strategy
(when the firm’s CSR statements follow observed behavior). Wagner et al. also note that
inconsistent information in proactive or reactive reporting increases perceptions of
hypocrisy, such that CSR statements can actually be counterproductive.
Regardless of the positive or negative effect of CSR reporting, Schuler and
Cording (2006) note customers must be aware of CSR characteristics for CSR
differentiation to be successful. As such, I suggest that management’s focus on customers
influences management’s decision to engage in CSR reporting activity:

H4:

The likelihood that a firm will initiate voluntary, stand-alone corporate social
responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the firm’s prior year
customer focus.

21

F. Related Studies
My study is related to, but differs from, the 1992 study of Roberts entitled
Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: An Application of
Stakeholder Theory. A primary difference in our studies is the CSR disclosure sample
selection. Roberts (1992) uses data from the book Rating America’s Corporate Conscious
(1986) compiled and published by the US Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). The
CEP samples 130 large Fortune 500 corporations in 1984, 1985 and 1986, rating the level
of corporate social responsibility disclosures for each company included in their study.
The dependent variable for social disclosure (CSR) in Roberts (1992) is the level of CSR
disclosure for firm i in period t (0, poor; 1, good; 2, excellent) based on the CEP ratings. I
examine stand-alone CSR reports issued directly by corporations. I do not consider the
external ratings or performance of CSR, but focus instead on the initiation of voluntary
CSR information disclosure. Roberts (1992) uses a debt to equity ratio to proxy for
potential creditor influence on determinants of CSR and finds a positive association
between the debt ratio and CSR disclosure. Robert’s study does not consider the
influence of labor on voluntary CSR disclosure.
My study is also related to, but differs from, Dhaliwal et al. (2011). Again, the
primary difference in our studies is the CSR disclosure sample as well as my focus on
debt and employee stakeholders. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also examines voluntary CSR
reports, gathering data from CorporateRegister.com and directly from corporate websites.
The period tested in their study is 1993 to 2007. I examine voluntary CSR reporting from
2002 to 2012, updating the sample period and emphasizing an era of CSR reports that are
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more likely to have a uniform and broad scope than early CSR issuances.11 Dhaliwal et
al. (2011) also models determinants of CSR initiation. While debtholders are not the
primary focus of the authors’ study, a control variable is included for financial leverage.
Further discussion can be found in the results section of this paper.

III. Sample and Methodology
A. Sample Description
For the period of 2002 to 2012, I collect data from three primary sources:
CorporateRegister.com, Compustat North American Fundamentals Annual, and the
Union Membership and Coverage Database. Table 2, Panel A, provides a breakdown of
the sample. I begin with all observations in Compustat and drop observations missing
total assets (AT) and values for market value of equity (SIZEMVE), Tobin’s Q
(TOBINQ), employees (EMP), labor pressure (LP) and profitability (ROA). I am left
with 51,957 firm-year observations spanning 8,720 firms from 2002 to 2012.

[ Insert Table 2, parts A & B ]

I utilize CorporateRegister.com to collect a sample of firms issuing stand-alone
CSR reports in the United States from 2002 to 2012. CorporateRegister.com is an
independent, privately held and self-funded organization that maintains a database of

11

Manually examining CSR reports from CorporateRegister.com, I note a shift between the years 2000 and 2002 in the
emphasis of firm’s CSR reporting. Early reports are more likely to emphasize environmental content, while more recent
reports offer broader stakeholder content. Further, although CSR reports continue to be unregulated voluntary
disclosures, there is a noticeable shift in the use of globally recognized content guidelines for CSR reporting post 2002.
CorporateRegister.com reports approximately 3, 30, and 50 percent of US issuers follow GRI standards to compile
their CSR reports in 2002, 2007, and 2012, respectively. This suggests more recent content is more likely to be both
comprehensive and consistent than that of early period CSR reports.
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corporate responsibility reports as well as limited descriptive information on the
reports.12,13 Each publicly traded CSR issuer is identified and hand matched by company
name with Compustat data.14 Table 2, Panel B, describes the CSR report sample by
year.15
CorporateRegister.com provides data for 2,639 US CSR reports from 2002 to
2012. Table 2 Part B details the 1,788 CSR reports issued by 454 publicly traded firms
meeting the criteria for the sample in this study. Of the 454 firms in the sample, 347 firms
initiated their CSR reporting practices in the sample period. The Global Reporting
Initiative is a non-profit organization that produces standards for sustainability reporting
(GRI). Although few CSR reports utilized the global reporting index early in the sample,
by 2012 approximately 50 percent of the sample is constructing their CSR reports using
GRI guidelines.

B. Empirical Models and Variables
In this study, I test the determinants of voluntary, non-financial disclosure by
examining the initiation of voluntary CSR reporting. As CSR disclosure policies may be
sticky, particularly if standards are not used to create consistency across years and firms,
12

CorporateRegister.com populates its database via reports directly provided by firms and active research via the
Internet and direct contact/inquiry with companies. The database features reports and reviews, but not brochures or
marketing and related publications. CorporateRegister.com does not feature publications, which are sales material, have
no reference year, no quantitative CR data and no statement of CR policy.
13 Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also utilize the CorporateRegister.com database and perform a comparison of stand-alone CSR
reports and CSR content in annual reports (10-Ks). The authors find that, on average, stand-alone CSR reports are
significantly longer – 28.3 pages versus 1.5 pages – and cover significantly more CSR issues – 6.4 issues versus 1.5
issues – compared to annual reports. Dhaliwal et al.’s findings are consistent with KPMG (2008), which finds that
among the largest 100 U.S. firms, only about 1 percent of them adequately integrate CSR reports into their annual
reports.
14 Note, company names are matched and GVKEY’s assigned to public CSR reporters. Subsidiary companies have
been assigned to their parent company’s GVKEY. For example: Ben & Jerry’s is a Unilever subsidiary and, therefore,
assigned the GVKEY for Unilever. In this study, a parent company is only permitted one CSR observation per year.
15 CorporateRegister.com occasionally lists multiple reports for a single issuer in a firm-year. In addition to the firm’s
CSR report, these can be summary reports of the comprehensive CSR report itself or additional environmental
disclosures. I count multiple reports as a single firm-year observation.
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I follow the partitioning of initiating and non-initiating CSR reporters found in Dhaliwal
et al. (2011) to test the first-time issuance of stand-alone CSR reports against all other
firms in the population. The following test is designed examine the influence of labor and
debtholders in the prior year on the likelihood of management to initiate voluntary CSR
reporting. The logistic regression model is specified as follows:

CSR_YR1i,t = 0 + 1LPi,t-1 + 2LEVi,t-1 + 3LEVi,t-1 *LPi,t-1 + 4ADV_INTi,t-1

(1)

5SIZEMVEi,t-1 + 6REGi,t-1 + 7GLOBALi,t-1 + 8PCT_CSRi,t-1 +
9COMPETITIONi,t-1 + 10ROAi,t-1 + 11TOBINQi,t-1 +
12LITRISKi,t-1 + ΣINDi, t + ΣYEARi,t +  i,t

In the model above, CSR_YR1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the first year
(initiating year) a stand-alone CSR report is recorded for firm i in the
CorporateRegister.com database, and 0 otherwise. Observations where CSR_YR1 are
equal to 0 include firm years where no CSR report has been issued by a firm, as well as
firm years in which non-initiating-year CSR reports are issued. The control group for test
one of my hypotheses is all non-CSR-initiators. Sensitivity testing of the control sample
can be found in Section V under CSR Report Initiation Sample.
The first variable of interest is labor pressure (LP), which captures the economic
influence of labor on the firm by measuring employees’ collective bargaining power, or
their ability to make demands of the firm from a strong bargaining position. Labor
pressure is calculated as the industry-level unionization rate times firm-level labor
intensity (Hilary 2006; Chen et al. 2011 and 2012). Industry-level unionization rates are
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provided by the Union Membership and Coverage Database, which is maintained
annually by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson.16 Union data comes from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ monthly Current Population Survey and a description of the Union
Membership Coverage Database can be found in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). I
specifically collect Hirsch and Macpherson data on union membership, coverage, density,
and employment by industry for the sample period. The data is provided by Census
Industrial Classification Codes, which are then converted into NAICS codes at the two-,
three-, four-, and five-digit level depending on specification for the CIC industry. Labor
intensity, also referred to as the labor to capital ratio, is a measure of the sensitivity of a
firm’s production function to labor. Labor intensity is the total number of employees
reported scaled by total assets for each firm. Labor pressure is the interaction of the size
of the employee’s bargaining unit and the sensitivity of the firm’s production function to
labor. I expect that as labor pressure increases, the likelihood of the firm engaging in
voluntary CSR reporting will also increase. For more details and examples of the labor
pressure calculation, see Appendix 2.
The second variable of interest is leverage (LEV). Leverage is a proxy for the
influence of debt in a firm’s capital structure on management. LEV is defined as the ratio
of a firm’s total debt divided by total assets for each observation year. Prior literature
suggests social responsibility disclosures may be viewed by management as a way to
meet certain debtholder expectations (Roberts 1992). I expect that as the influence of
debtholders increases, the likelihood of CSR reporting will also increase.

16

Barry Hirsch, W.J. Usery Chair of the American Workplace in the Department of Economics at Andrew Young
School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University, and David Macpherson, E.M. Stevens Professor of Economics at
Trinity University provide union membership data at no charge via their website: unionstats.com.
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To consider the relationship between labor, debtholders, and voluntary nonfinancial disclosure, I include the pairwise product of LP and LEV. I expect a positive
value for the effect of the interaction, which implies that the higher the labor pressure, the
greater (more positive) the effect of leverage on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR
reporting. Similarly, the higher the leverage, the greater (more positive) the effect of
labor pressure on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting.
The final variable of interest is advertising intensity. Advertising intensity
(ADV_INT) is a proxy for customer focus and calculated as the ratio of reported annual
advertising expense divided by average total assets per three-digit NAICS industry
classification (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Casey and Grenier 2014; Servaes and
Tamayo 2013). Cohen, Mashruwala, and Zach (2010) note promotional materials and
direct-response advertising is included as part of the advertising expense in Compustat,
but because Compustat has many missing data points for firm advertising expenditure, I
use an industry-specific measure in order to preserve sample size. I do, however, perform
sensitivity analysis wherein the sample size is reduced in order to examine the influence
of firm-specific advertising intensity.
I control for firm size (SIZEMVE) as size has been found to influence the firm’s
contractual relationships, visibility, disclosure, and political pressure (Lang and
Lundholm 1993; Healy and Palepu 2001; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Size is the market value
of equity at the beginning of each year. As the initial investment in voluntary CSR
reporting is relatively lower for large firms, I expect the propensity to disclose voluntary
non-financial CSR reports is positively associated with size. I also control for regulated
industries (REG), such as: mining, oil and gas, food and beverage, transportation,
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communication and utilities. Social welfare contributes to the regulation of industries in
the US and regulated industries are also subject to high levels of political pressure and
visibility (Stigler 1971). Management literature also suggests that regulation is an
institutional-level predictor of CSR actions and policies (Buehler and Shetty 1974;
Fineman and Clarke 1996). As such, I control for industries classified as regulated
following Hogan and Jeter (1999) and Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010).17
I control for competitive market pressures to issue CSR reports at the international
and industry levels. As issuance of CSR reports increases in international markets (see
Figure 1), firms operating globally face greater pressure to issue CSR reports – at a
minimum exploiting the opportunity for a lower cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al.
2011). As such, I include an indicator variable (GLOBAL) equal to 1 if a firm reports
non-zero foreign income, and 0 otherwise.
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), suggest industry-specific characteristics influence CSR
reporting. To control for industry peer pressure, I include PCT_CSR, a variable
measuring the percentage of the top 50 firms in the three-digit NAICS industry who issue
CSR reports. The higher the top 50 percentage, the more pressure a firm is under to
follow the industry leaders. Under the proprietary cost hypothesis, firms’ decisions to
disclose information are influenced by concern that such disclosures can damage their
competitive position in product markets (Verrecchia 1983; Healy and Palepu 2001). To
control for product competition (COMPETITION), I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
to measure competitiveness of the firm within its industry. The Herfindahl index is

17

Hogan and Jeter classify the following two-digit SIC codes as regulated, following Regulatory Reform: What
Actually Happened (Weiss and Klass 1986) and Danos and Eichenseher (1982): 10, 12-14, 20, 29, 40-42, 44-46, 48, 49,
60-64, 67. Per Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010), no regulated two-digit SIC industries have been deregulated, but two-digit
codes 43 and 47 are also classified as regulated post 1993.
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calculated by taking the sum of the squared market share of the 50 largest firms in each
three-digit NAICS industry. Market share is measured as each firm’s percentage of total
sales in its three-digit NAICS industry for the year. For industries with fewer than 50
firms, the Herfindahl index is calculated using all firms in the industry. Finally, the
Herfindahl index is multiplied by -1, so that firms with a larger (less negative) index
represent firms in industries with more concentration and less competition.
In addition to controlling for firm size, I include two control variables for the
financial state of the firm – return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ). Lang and
Lundholm (1993) find disclosure ratings are increasing in firm performance, and both
marketing (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006) and accounting (Dhaliwal et al. 2011) literature
suggest that firms with better financial performance are more likely to engage in CSR
activities. ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets
at the beginning of each year. TOBINQ is the control variable for firm growth. Dhaliwal
et al. (2011) find a negative and significant relationship between growth and CSR
initiation in their 2002 to 2007 international CSR report sample. The authors suggest that
firms in an expansionary period are more financially constrained and have fewer
resources for CSR activities and disclosure.
Prior literature (Skinner 1979; Healy and Palepu 2001) documents that litigation
risk is related to voluntary disclosure decision and that litigation potentially reduces
incentives to provide disclosure. Litigation risk (LITRISK) is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if a firm operates in a high litigation industry and 0 otherwise.18

18

Following Dhaliwal et al. (2011), litigation risk industries are those in the following SIC industry classifications:
2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370.
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To control for the industry effects, I estimate the model using industry fixed
effects (three-digit NAICS). Industry fixed effects control for the effect of a particular
industry on the likelihood of CSR issuance. Finally, I include year fixed effects to control
for macroeconomic events.

C. Secondary Test of the Interaction Variable
Applied economic research argues that assessing the statistical significance of
interaction effects in nonlinear models, such as the logit model used in my study, with a
simple statistical test on the coefficient on the interaction term is subject to complication
(Ai and Norton 2003; Greene 2010; Ozer Balli and Sørensen 2013). Greene (2010) notes
the interaction effect in the nonlinear model is at least partly an artifact of the functional
form chosen (Greene 2010). Both LP and LEV are continuous variables, which further
complicates the interpretation of the interaction in my study. To address this concern, I
perform additional analysis by examining the effect of debtholders on voluntary CSR
reporting at two levels of labor pressure. I bisect the sample into firms characterized as
having lower LP (below the median) and higher LP (above the median). This test is
designed to examine the influence of debtholders in the prior year on the likelihood of
management to initiate voluntary CSR reporting under (I) low levels of labor influence
and (II) high levels of labor influence. The logistic regression model is specified as
follows:
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CSR_YR1i,t = 0 + 1LEVi,t-1 + 2ADV_INTi,t-1 + 3SIZEMVEi,t-1 +

(2)

4REGi,t-1 + 5GLOBALi,t-1 + 6PCT_CSRi,t-1 +
7COMPETITIONi,t-1 + 8ROAi,t-1 + 9TOBINQi,t-1 +
10LITRISKi,t-1 + ΣINDi, t + ΣYEARi,t +  i,t

To control for the industry effects, I estimate the model using industry fixed effects
(three-digit NAICS). Industry fixed effects control for the effect of a particular industry
on the likelihood of CSR issuance. Finally, I include year fixed effects to control for
macroeconomic events.

IV. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the full sample can be found in Table 3,
Panel A and B, respectively. As seen in Table 3, Panel A, mean labor pressure is
significantly lower for CSR initiators (0.0004 for initiators versus 0.0007 for noninitiators where p < 0.01) and CSR initiators have significantly lower leverage (LEV)
than non-initiators (p < 0.01). These statistics suggest that labor and debtholders have less
leverage, or influence, on management of firms initiating CSR activity. Mean advertising
intensity is not significantly different for CSR report initiators and non-initiators
(ADV_INT: 0.0125 and 0.0115, respectively), suggesting a similar customer emphasis by
both groups.

[ Insert Table 3 ]
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Firms initiating CSR reporting are significantly larger (SIZEMVE: 8.5387 for
initiators and 5.1053 for non-initiators), significantly more likely to be found in a
regulated industry (REG p < 0.01), and have a significantly higher level of global
operations (GLOBAL: 0.6772 for initiators and 0.2903 for non-initiators). Initiating firms
are also more likely to experience peer pressure on CSR issuance as the percentage of the
top 50 firms (sales leaders) issuing CSR reports in their industry is significantly higher
for initiators (PCT_CSR: 0.0559) than non-initiators (PCT_CSR: 0.0250). Competition
within the firm’s industry is not statistically different between the sample, where
COMPETITION is -.0808 for initiators and -0.0751 for non-initiators.
Financially, initiators are significantly more profitable (ROA of 0.0639) than noninitiators (-0.3093) and significantly less likely to be experiencing high growth
(TOBINQ: 1.6908 for initiators and 3.5650 for non-initiators). Finally, firms initiating
CSR reports have significantly lower levels of litigation risk than their non-initiating
counterparts (p < 0.01).

B. CSR Initiation
I predict labor, debtholders, and customers influence firms’ CSR reporting in
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, respectively. I empirically examine the influence of these
stakeholders on the likelihood of the firm to initiate stand-alone, voluntary CSR reports in
test 1 below. I report regression results for Equation (1) in Table 4. Column I includes all
first-time reporting firm-year observations. Column II includes the interaction of leverage
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and labor pressure (LEV*LP). Columns III and IV test the robustness of the results by
excluding utilities and limited to environmentally sensitive industries.19

[ Insert Table 4 ]

Across all four specifications of the dependent variable, the results support H1 and H2.
Labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and positively associated with a firm’s
likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report in year t
(coef: 12.414; 12.387; 12.530; 11.258 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01 for Columns I, II,
III, and IV, respectively). Leverage (LEV) in year t-1 is also significantly and positively
associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone
CSR report in year t (coef: 0.786; 0.785; 0.827; 1.262 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.0; 0.01 for
Columns I, II, III, and IV, respectively). H4, that customer focus (ADV_INT) in year t-1
is significantly and positively associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating
the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report in year t, is supported in all specifications of the
dependent variable (coef: 55.942; 55.943; 55.715; 57.452 and p < 0.05; 0.05; 0.05; 0.10
for Columns I, II, III, and IV, respectively). The marginal effect of labor pressure,
leverage, and advertising intensity is 0.083; 0.0053; and 0.375, respectively. Thus the
likelihood of CSR report initiation increases with all three primary variables of interest at
a rate such that, if the rate were constant, the likelihood of CSR report initiation would
increase by 8.3%; 0.53%; and 37.5% if labor pressure, leverage, or advertising increased
19

Utilities are all firms in the two-digit NAICS code 22. Environmentally sensitive industries include included in the
US Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory Program (TRI). A detailed listing of these industries
can be found at http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/my-facilitys-six-digit-naics-code-tricovered-industry. Sensitivity analysis of environmental industries was conducted following Plumlee, Brown, Hayes
and Marshall (2014) who classify the following industries as environmentally sensitive: oil & gas, chemical, food and
beverage, pharmaceutical and electrical utilities.
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by 1, respectively. These results suggest that when labor, debtholders, and customers are
more influential at a given firm, there should be a greater propensity to disclose CSR
activities.
In my first test of H3, the interactive effect between labor and debtholders on the
propensity to disclose, I examine the results of LEV*LP in Table 4, columns II, III, and
IV. The interaction of debt and labor (LEV*LP) is also significantly and positively
associated with the dependent variable across all three model specifications (coef: 2.500;
2.508; 2.122 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.01 for Columns II, III, and IV, respectively). This
suggests that the higher the labor pressure, the greater (more positive) the effect of
leverage on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting. Similarly, the higher the
leverage, the greater (more positive) the effect of labor pressure on the likelihood of a
firm to initiate CSR reporting. More generally, my findings suggest the interaction
between two stakeholder groups influence voluntary disclosure activities.
The coefficient estimates on the control variables are generally consistent with
expectations per the prior literature, with one significant exception: ROA. As seen in
Table 4, ROA is positive and significant across all four specifications of the dependent
variable with a coefficient of 1.860; 1.861; 1.846; 2.209 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01 for
columns I, II, III, and IV, respectively. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also report a positive
association between CSR initiation and ROA, but they do not show the relationship to be
significant. Empirical evidence from the marketing literature (Luo and Bhatacharya
2006) finding positive association between CSR and market value (measured using ROA)
supports the findings in this paper suggesting ROA is positively and significantly
associated with the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting.
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C. CSR Initiation Partitioned by Labor Pressure
In Hypothesis 3, I predict the interaction of labor and debt influence the likelihood
of the firm to initiate stand-alone, voluntary CSR reports. I report results for Equation (2),
further examining the interaction between labor and debt on voluntary CSR disclosure, in
Table 5, where Column I includes all firms with labor pressure below the median (lower)
and Column II includes all firms with labor pressure above the median (higher).

[ Insert Table 5 ]

As seen in Column I, leverage (LEV) is positive (coef: 0.295) but not statistically
significant (p > 0.10) in the sample of firms with lower levels of labor pressure. This
suggests that in an environment in which employees have low levels of bargaining power,
capital structure of the firm is less likely to influence firms’ decision to initiate voluntary
CSR reporting. However, in a sample of firms with higher levels of labor pressure
(Column II), leverage is both positive and significant (coef: 1.171 and p < 0.01) with
respect to voluntary CSR initiation. This suggests firms with high labor pressure and a
high degree of leverage are more likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities.
To further test the difference between LEV (I) from the lower LP sample and
LEV (II) from the higher LP sample, I estimate Equation 2 with the addition of two
variables – a binary variable (HIGH) equal to 1 if labor pressure for the observation is in
the higher partition and zero if the observation is in the lower partition. The second
additional variable is an interaction of the new binary variable and LEV*(HIGH*LEV).
The 1.650 coefficient on HIGH*LEV is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.10).

35

The marginal effect of leverage on CSR initiation is higher in the high LP sample (0.008)
than the low LP sample (0.006). The marginal effects are statistically different (p < 0.01),
again suggesting the likelihood of a firm initiating CSR reporting is greater at higher
leverage for firms in the top half of labor pressure. Overall, the combined results of
Columns I and II suggest capital structure strategy influences voluntary disclosure
activity and the influence of labor on CSR reporting dominates the influence of
debtholders.

D. Odds Ratios
Coefficients in logit models represent log-odds units and are interpreted
differently than standard OLS coefficients. For an additional interpretation of the results,
beyond the marginal effects related to the results found in Tables 4 and 5, I estimate the
odds ratios of the dependent variable. Odds ratios range between zero and infinity and are
generated from probabilities. Here, the odds ratios are the ratio of the probability of the
binary outcome of the dependent variable, CSR report initiation. The coefficients in the
following specification represent the odds of CSR initiation (CSR_YR1 = 1) when the
dependent variable increases by one unit. The odds of CSR initiation increases
(decreases) if the coefficient for the independent variable is greater than 1 (less than 1).

[ Insert Table 6 ]

As seen in Table 6, the odds ratios for LP, LEV, and ADV_INT are all greater than 1
(OR: 239,598; 2.193; and greater than 1 billion, respectively) suggesting the odds of

36

voluntary CSR report initiation increases with labor pressure, debt, and customer
awareness. The odds ratios can also be reduced to interpret the effect of the independent
variables on CSR report initiation. For example, a 1 percent increase in LP increases the
odds of a firm initiating CSR reporting by 2,396. Furthermore, the significant p-values
for labor pressure, debtholders, and customer awareness seen in the CSR Initiation
Sample results reported in Table 6 (p < 0.01; 0.01; and 0.05 for LP; LEV; and
ADV_INT, respectively) suggest all three of the primary variables of interest have a
significant influence on voluntary CSR report initiation. Columns I and II of Table 6
report the results of Equation 2 with odds ratios. The odds of debtholders (LEV)
influencing voluntary CSR report initiation are not significant in the sample with lower
labor pressure (p > 0.10). But capital structure does have a positive influence on a firm
initiating CSR reporting in a sample of firms with higher labor pressure (p < 0.01), where
the odds of a firm initiating CSR disclosures increases 3.227 when LEV increases by 1
unit. These results support the hypothesis in this study.

V. Additional Analyses
A. CSR Report Initiation Sample
I report the results of sensitivity analysis on the CSR initiation sample in Table 6.
I consider the timing of CSR report initiation and the use of lagged independent
variables, as seen in Equation 1, in Column I of Table 6. Columns II and III report results
using alternate methods for generating the control group (CSR_YR1 = 0).
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i. Timing of Stakeholder Pressure and CSR Report Issuance
CSR reporting is voluntary in the US and there is no standardized reporting
deadline for firms who issue stand-alone reports. An examination of CSR Report Alerts
from CorporateRegister.com for the period of 2011 to 2012 suggests that 78 percent of
CSR reports are issued between May and July. Given the gap between a standard
December 31 fiscal year end and the potential issuance month of the CSR report,
stakeholder pressure in the year covered by the CSR report, rather than the prior year,
could influence CSR disclosure. As such, I re-examine CSR initiation and disclosure with
non-lagged variables of interest and controls. The results of examining CSR disclosure
hold, in both directional association and significance. As seen in Column I of Table 7,
Labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and positively associated with a firm’s
likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report in year t
(coef: 10.744 and p < 0.01). Debtholders and customers also remain significantly and
positively associated with voluntary CSR report initiation (coef: 0.833; 52.641 and p <
0.01; p < 0.05, respectively for LEV and ADV_INT). The interactive relationship
between LEV*LP also holds in Column I (coef: 2.327 and p < 0.05).

[ Insert Table 7 ]

ii. Treatment of Post-Initiation Years
For the primary tests in this study, observations where CSR_YR1 are equal to 0
include firm years where no CSR report has been issued by a firm, as well as firm years
in which non-initiating-year CSR reports are issued. I test the sensitivity of the control
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sample in two ways. First, I drop all observations for CSR issuing firms subsequent to
their CSR report initiation year (post-initiation drop). This treatment drops 118 firms
from the sample that initiated CSR reporting prior to 2002, including 11 firms that did not
engage in CSR reporting during the sample period and 107 firms who did. Dropping
firms post-CSR initiation isolates the decision to initiate CSR reporting. This sample to
test CSR initiation has 49,894 firm-year observations spanning 8,602 firms from 2002 to
2012. As seen in Column II of Table 7, labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and
positively associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a
stand-alone CSR report in year t (coef: 14.843 and p < 0.01). Debtholders and customers
also remain significantly and positively associated with voluntary CSR report initiation
(coef: 0.851; 48.969 and p < 0.01; p < 0.05, respectively for LEV and ADV_INT). The
interactive relationship between LEV*LP also holds in the post-initiation drop results
reported in Column II (coef: 2.993 and p < 0.01).
For the second sensitivity analysis of the CSR initiation control sample, I again
drop firms subsequent to their initiation of CSR reporting. But in this analysis, I only
drop CSR reporting firms post-initiation if the firm is classified as a consistent CSR
reporter. Consistent reporters are identified as firms that do not stop issuing stand-alone
CSR reports in the sample period once they initiate CSR reporting. This method for
generating the control group includes non-initiation years for non-consecutive CSR
reporters, as these firms are likely to engage in ongoing CSR initiation decisions. As seen
in Column III of Table 7, labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and positively
associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone
CSR report in year t (coef: 12.498 and p < 0.01). Debtholders and customers also remain
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significantly and positively associated with voluntary CSR report initiation (coef: 0.825;
56.234 and p < 0.01; p < 0.05, respectively for LEV and ADV_INT). The interactive
relationship between LEV*LP also holds in Column I (coef: 2.536 and p < 0.01).

B. Ongoing Voluntary CSR Reporting
The primary tests in my study examine the influence of labor and debt on
voluntary CSR disclosure initiation. An argument can be made that each CSR report
released is the result of a decision to engage in voluntary disclosure. As such, I examine
the determinants of all CSR report issuances in the sample period by following Equation
1, but changing the dependent variable to all CSR report issuances (CSR_PUBYR):

CSR_PUBYRi,t = 0 + 1LPi,t-1 + 2LEVi,t-1 + 3LEVi,t-1 *LPi,t-1 +

(3)

4ADV_INTi,t-1 + 5SIZEMVEi,t-1 + 6REGi,t-1 +
7GLOBALi,t-1 + 8PCT_CSRi,t-1 + 9COMPETITIONi,t-1 +
10ROAi,t-1 + 11TOBINQi,t-1 + 12LITRISKi,t-1 +
ΣINDi, t + ΣYEARi,t +  i,t

As seen in Table 7, the results from my primary examination of CSR reporting hold when
testing is extended to all 1,788 CSR reports issued by 454 companies from 2002 to 2012.
The coefficients for labor and debtholders are both positive and significant for all CSR
reporters (coef: 15.628; 0.696 and p < 0.01; 0.01, respectively for LP and LEV). The
association between customer focus and ongoing CSR report issuance is not significant,
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but the interaction LEV*LP is consistently positive with a coefficient of 2.653 and
significant at the 1 percent level.

[ Insert Table 8 ]

Reported in Columns I and II of Table 7 are the results of a secondary test of the
interaction variable from Equation 3. The findings in Table 5 also hold when utilizing the
full CSR reporting sample from 2002 to 2012 to more closely examine the interaction
between CSR reporting, labor pressure, and debt. I am unable to reject the null of
Hypothesis 2 for the partition of the full sample that has labor pressure in the lower 50
percent of the sample (Column I LEV coef: 0.307 and p > 0.10), whereas the coefficient
for LEV in the upper level of labor pressure (Column II) is 0.980 and significant at the
1% level. Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEV from the low and high
partitioned tests of the full sample to be positive and significant (coef: 1.042 and p <
0.01). This finding suggests the influence of labor and capital structure extend to ongoing
stand-alone, voluntary CSR reporting.

C. Consistent and Non-Consistent CSR Reporting
The results for the primary variables of interest LEV, LP, and LEV*LP hold when
the CSR reporting sample is constrained to firms who issue consecutive (consistent) CSR
reports. Consistent CSR reporting firms do not stop releasing reports in the sample period
once they have started issuing stand-alone CSR reports. The results for LEV and LP also
hold when the sample is constrained to non-consecutive (non-consistent) CSR report
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issuers. Non-consistent CSR reporting firms are those who either skip CSR reporting
years or who stop issuing CSR reports after one or two years of CSR reporting activity.
Table 9 reports the results of examining CSR initiation (Equation 1) and ongoing CSR
reporting (Equation 2).

[ Insert Table 9 ]

Examining CSR report initiation, I find coefficients for both labor pressure (LP) and
debtholder influence (LEV) are positive and significant for consistent reporters (coef:
18.451; 0.833 and p < 0.01; 0.01) as well as for non-consistent reporters (coef: 8.304;
0.785 and p < 0.01; 0.01). The results of LP and LEV are also consistent for ongoing
CSR reporting by consistent reporters (coef: 12.540; 0.919 and p < 0.01; 0.01) as well as
for non-consistent reporters (coef: 18.239; 0.549 and p < 0.01; 0.01). These findings
support Hypotheses 1 and 2 as well as the results found in Table 4. Hypothesis 3 is also
supported across consistent (coef: 4.613 and p < 0.01) and non-consistent reporters (coef:
1.356 and p < 0.10). Additional testing of LEV*LP for ongoing CSR reporting is also
supported across consistent (coef: 1.770 and p < 0.01) and non-consistent reporters (coef:
3.319 and p < 0.01). However, when the sample is partitioned by consistent and nonconsistent reporters, customer influence is only positively and significantly associated
with non-continuous CSR report initiators (coef: 81.448 and p < 0.05). This suggests that
non-continuous issuers are more likely to consider CSR reporting a marketable event, as
opposed to their continuously reporting counterparts.
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D. Robustness of Labor Pressure
I state in Hypothesis 1 that the likelihood a firm will initiate voluntary, standalone corporate social responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the firm’s
prior year labor pressure. The primary measure of labor pressure (LP) in this study is an
economic measure of the influence of employees vis-à-vis extraction of economic rents
from the firm. As an alternative to measuring economic labor pressure, I consider the
social, reputational, and regulatory risk of labor pressure (hereafter, “labor risk”) on
voluntary disclosure, embodied by CSR reporting. Using the “List of Goods Produced by
Child Labor or Forced Labor” released by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of
International Labor Affairs (2013), I identify three-digit NAICS industries related to
goods that are considered high risk for affiliation with child or forced labor. These
industries are more closely monitored by federal agencies and face greater risk of
reputational and societal effects associated with the discovery of illegal and/or unethical
labor practices.20 I report the determinants of voluntary CSR report initiation in Table 10
with labor risk (LP_RISK) as the primary measure of labor’s influence on CSR reporting
(Column I). All variables of interest remain positive and statistically significant,
including labor risk (coef: 1.484 and p < 0.05). As seen in column IV, I add back the
economic measure of labor pressure for a comprehensive examination of labor and CSR
reporting. I find the likelihood of voluntary CSR report initiation increases as both
economic (LP coef: 12.387 and p < 0.01) and reputational/regulatory (LP_RISK coef:
1.491 and p < 0.05) labor pressure increase. The results found in Table 10 support

20

Many firms include in their CSR reports disclosures of labor policies specifically related to illegal and unethical
labor practices, such as: labor trafficking, child labor, and forced labor. Apple’s CSR reports are dominated by
disclosures related to labor in international factories producing Apple products. See also Nike (Marshall 1997; Knight
and Greenberg 2002) and Del Monte (U.S. EEOC 2011) for examples of labor risk.
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Hypothesis 1, that firms are more likely to issue voluntary CSR reports in industries
exposed to higher labor pressure.

[ Insert Table 10 ]

E. Consideration of Distressed Firms
Distressed firms, or firms a high probability of bankruptcy, face incentive effects
associated with debt that non-distressed firms do not (see Jensen and Meckling 1978;
Eisdorfer 2008). Using Altman’s Z-score (Altman 1968), I find 97 of the 347 CSR
initiators in the sample period are classified as distressed at the time of disclosure
initiation (CSR_YR1 = 1), having an Altman’s Z-score of less than 1.81. To minimize the
risk of these highly levered firms biasing my study, I exclude distressed firms and reexamine the results found in Table 5. The results of this sensitivity analysis are reported
in Table 11.

[ Insert Table 11 ]

When the sample is partitioned by labor pressure and restricted to firms
characterized as not distressed, 28 CSR initiating observations are dropped from the
lower LP sample and 69 observations are dropped from the higher LP sample. In both
estimations, LEV is consistent with prior results – positive, but not significant in the
lower LP sample (coef: 0.336; p > 0.10), and positive and significant in the higher LP
sample (coef: 2.052; p < 0.01). Furthermore, I find a positive and significant difference in
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the coefficients of the two samples when distressed firms are excluded (coef: 1.806; p <
0.05). The results of the sensitivity analysis suggest distressed firms do not influence the
primary findings of my study.

F. Endogeneity
Timing could be a source of potential endogeneity effects, particularly as the
timing relates to debt issuances (impacting LEV) and advertising campaigns (impacting
ADV_INT). By addressing timing concerns in Table 7, Column I, I am also addressing
the endogenous timing effects impacting LEV and ADV_INT. The non-lagged results
reported in Table 7 (Column I) remain consistent with the lagged regression model
reported in Table 4, where non-lagged LP, LEV, ADV_INT, and the interaction LEV*LP
all remain positive (coef: 10.774; 0.833; 52.641; and 2.327) and significantly associated
with voluntary CSR initiation (p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.05; and 0.05). Although a firm may defer
a debt issuance or major advertising campaign for a year to reap the reputational benefits
of CSR issuance, it is less likely the reputational benefits of CSR are strong enough to
influence a two-year hold in material capital market or marketing strategy for the firm.

G. Firm-Specific Advertising Intensity
Advertising intensity is calculated as ratio of reported annual advertising expense
divided by average total assets per three-digit NAICS industry classification following
Luo and Bhattacharya (2006), Casey and Grenier (2014) and Servaes and Tamayo
(2013). As an additional analysis, I recalculate advertising intensity at the firm level as
advertising expense (Compustat: XAD) scaled by total assets. As Compustat has many
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missing data points for firm-level advertising expenditure, this specification decreases the
sample size from 51,957 to 18,236. Despite the decrease in sample size, I find for a
sample of 191 CSR reporters, the coefficients for LP, LEV, and the firm-level advertising
measure are positive and significant (coef: 9.052; 0.4891; 1.933 and p < 0.001; 0.001,
0.05, respectively). The interaction of LP and LEV also remains positive and significant
(coef: 15.1626 and p < 0.01) with the alternate specification of customer pressure and the
reduced sample size. These results suggest customer pressure at the firm level is
positively and significantly associated with CSR disclosure.

VI. Conclusion
The number of firms issuing voluntary CSR reports in the US is small, but
steadily increasing from year to year. Despite the visibility and economic impact of these
firms, extant literature provides limited information on what motivates their decision to
engage in voluntary CSR disclosures (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). I examine the influence of
labor, debtholders, customers, and capital structure strategy on determinants of voluntary,
stand-alone CSR reports in order to expand our understanding of how the demand for
voluntary non-financial disclosure arises and the influence of production-related frictions
on firms’ voluntary disclosure activities. I find firms with high labor pressure, a high
degree of leverage, and high levels of advertising intensity in the prior year are more
likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year. Further, I examine the
interactive influence of labor and leverage on the likelihood of a firm to engage in
voluntary CSR disclosure activity. I find firms more likely to deploy high leverage as a
capital market strategy to offset pecuniary labor compensation are also more likely to
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initiate voluntary CSR reporting than their counterparts. My findings indicate labor, debt,
and capital structure strategy influence voluntary disclosure activity.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the prior CSR and voluntary
disclosure literature by empirically examining stakeholder influence on the determinants
of voluntary, stand-alone CSR reporting. I contribute to future Corporate Social
Responsibility research by providing a model to control for selection bias related to the
CSR disclosure decision. The model in this paper can be used as the first step in twostaged research designs considering the consequences of CSR reporting and CSR quality.
Furthermore, CSR reports represent a unique opportunity to examine the
influence of stakeholders on voluntary disclosure and a forum for future research on the
benefits, both financial and managerial, of voluntary disclosures on stakeholder
interaction. My findings suggest opportunities for future research on the value of
employee-related disclosures, specifically research on how CSR reports can be used to
mitigate direct and indirect costs of the production function.
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Appendix 1: CSR Report Content
GRI G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines

The following is an outline of CSR report content as recommended by the Global
Reporting Initiative. Under G3 Guidelines,21 standard disclosures include:
A. Firm Strategy and Profile
This section includes strategy and analysis, a profile of the organization, report
parameters; governance, commitments, and firm engagements; and a discussion
of management approach and performance indicators. Often, these issues are
addressed in the form of a letter from the CEO.
B. Economic
Economic CSR disclosures include firm performance, market presence, and a
discussion of indirect economic impacts.
C. Environmental
Environmental disclosures discuss materials, energy, water, biodiversity,
emissions/waste, products and services, compliance, and transport.
D. Social – Labor Practices and Decent Work
This section includes employee descriptives (i.e.: gender, geography, age), as well
as disclosures relating to occupational health and safety; training and education,
labor/management relations; diversity and equal opportunity; and equal
remuneration for women and men.
E. Social – Human Rights
Human rights disclosures may discuss non-discrimination, employee’s freedom of
association and right to engage in collective bargaining, child labor, forced labor,
Indigenous rights, human rights investment, and remediation.
F. Social – Society
This section is intended to discuss interactions with local communities, public
policy, compliance activities, anti-competitive behaviors, and corruption
concerns/issues.
G. Social – Product Responsibility
Product responsibility disclosures include customer health and safety, product and
service labeling, marketing communications, customer privacy, and compliance.

21

GRI’s G3 Guidelines were implemented in 2006 and can be found at www.globalreporting.org.
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Appendix 2: Labor Pressure (LP)
I define Labor pressure (LP) as an economic measure of employee bargaining
power with the firm. As employee bargaining power increases, employees are able to
demand greater compensation and exert wage pressure on the firm. In my study,
bargaining power is measured as a function of the size of the employee bargaining unit
and the importance of employees to the production function of the firm.
One way employees improve their bargaining power is to unionize and bargain
with the firm in larger, collective units. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012 Union
Members report notes unionized employees have median usual weekly earnings that are
27 percent higher than those who were not union members. Bargaining power, however,
is not just a function of the percentage of employees participating in the collective
bargaining unit, but also a function of the importance of employees to the production
function of the firm. To that end, the variable LP in this study is intended to capture not
just unionization of employees, but the larger degree of influence held by employee
stakeholders over a firm’s production function.
Hilary (2006) and Chen et al. (2011) suggest labor strength (bargaining power) is
a product of the unionization rate and labor intensity, where labor intensity is measured
as the number of employees scaled by total assets – a measure also known as the labor to
capital ratio. Further discussion of each component can be found below:

Unionization
Under the Labor-Management-Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMDRA),
labor unions and firms are not required file copies of collective bargaining agreements
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with the US Department of Labor’s Office of Labor Management Standards (OLMS).22
As such, firm-specific data relating to the number of employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement (unionized employees) is only disclosed by voluntary firm or
employee action.
As firm-specific data is difficult to obtain and may be incomplete per publicly
available resources, researchers turn to industry measures of unionization, notably the
Hirsch and Macpherson database at unionstats.com. In the Hirsch and Macpherson
database, union data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ monthly Current
Population Survey. A description of the Union Membership Coverage Database can be
found in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). I specifically collect Hirsch and Macpherson
data on union membership, coverage, density, and employment by industry for the
sample period. The data is provided by Census Industrial Classification Codes, which are
then converted into NAICS codes at the two-, three-, four-, and five-digit level depending
on specification for the CIC industry.

Labor Intensity
Classical economists, including Adam Smith and David Ricardo, describe the
production of a firm with the following function:

Y = f (L, K, N)

, where Y is firm production, L is land, K is capital, and N is labor.

22

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, As Amended. See Right to Copies of Collective
Bargaining Agreements (29 U.S.C. 414).
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Capital can be defined as financial capital (funds used to operate and expand
business) or fixed capital (plant, property, equipment). In this study, land and capital are
combined and measured as the total assets of a firm.23 The labor to capital ratio, also
referred to as labor intensity (Hilary 2006; Chen, Chen, and Liao 2011; Chen, Chen, and
Wang 2012), is a measure of the sensitivity of a firm’s production function to labor.

Labor Pressure
Firms with high labor intensity have a greater sensitivity to economic factors,
such as workforce supply and unemployment rates. In the presence of organized labor,
labor sensitive firms are subject to the bargaining pressures of employees not as a single
unit, but as collective units. Following Hilary (2006); Chen et al. (2011); and Chen et al.
(2012), I interact labor intensity with the Hirsch and Macpherson unionization rate at the
greatest level of firm specificity. For a better understanding of the labor pressure
measure, below is an example of LP calculated for firms across two different three-digit
NAICS industries for the year 2011. The Crop Production industry (three-digit NAICS:
111) has a Hirsh and Macpherson unionization rate of 0.0190 for all firms at the threedigit NAICS level. I also include the top 20 percent of firms, based on total assets, from
the 2011 Food Manufacturing industry (three-digit NAICS: 311). Hirsch and Macpherson
identify a total of seven different unionization rates for the Food Manufacturing industry,
five of which are represented in the top 20 percent sample.
I include data on whether or not firms issued a CSR report in 2011, but it should
be noted that not all firms who issue CSR reports do so continuously. Chiquita Brands
International, for example, issued a CSR report in 2010, but not in 2011.
23

For sensitivity analysis of the combined capital and land measure of total assets, see Section V.
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Appendix 2: Labor Pressure (LP) – Continued

Labor Pressure (LP) Calculation - 2011 NAICS Industry Sample

Company Name
NAICS 111: Crop Production
DOLE FOOD CO INC
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTL INC
YASHENG GROUP
ROYAL HAWAIIAN ORCHARDS-LP
LIMONEIRA CO
TEJON RANCH CO
ALICO INC
VIASPACE INC
NAICS 311: Food Manufacturing
TYSON FOODS INC -CL A
SMITHFIELD FOODS INC
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP
LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP
CAMPBELL SOUP CO
SMUCKER (JM) CO
DEAN FOODS CO
PEPSICO INC
COCA-COLA CO
GENERAL MILLS INC
BUNGE LTD
KELLOGG CO

EMP ÷

Labor
Unionization
= Intensity *
Rate
=

AT

LP

LP * 1,000

CSR

71.00
21.00
15.00
0.29
0.20
0.15
0.13
0.10

4,270.07
1,937.96
2,057.50
57.04
159.03
321.98
180.04
10.21

0.0166
0.0108
0.0073
0.0051
0.0013
0.0005
0.0007
0.0102

0.0190
0.0190
0.0190
0.0190
0.0190
0.0190
0.0190
0.0190

0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0002

0.3159
0.2059
0.1385
0.0966
0.0243
0.0086
0.0141
0.1935

Yes

115.00
46.35
39.50
11.71
17.50
4.50
24.07
297.00
146.20
35.00
34.00
30.67

11,071.00
7,611.80
2,879.55
9,263.19
6,862.00
8,324.58
5,754.36
72,882.00
79,974.00
18,674.50
23,275.00
11,901.00

0.0104
0.0061
0.0137
0.0013
0.0026
0.0005
0.0042
0.0041
0.0018
0.0019
0.0015
0.0026

0.2030
0.2030
0.2030
0.2030
0.1780
0.1780
0.1370
0.1020
0.1020
0.0940
0.0940
0.0940

0.0021
0.0012
0.0028
0.0003
0.0005
0.0001
0.0006
0.0004
0.0002
0.0002
0.0001
0.0002

2.1087
1.2361
2.7846
0.2566
0.4539
0.0962
0.5730
0.4157
0.1865
0.1762
0.1373
0.2423

Yes
Yes

Variable Descriptions
EM P

=

The number of 2011 employees reported for the firm per Compustat.

AT

=

Total assets (AT) reported for the firm in 2011 per Compustat.

LP

=

Labor pressure per this study and Hilary (2006); Chen, Chen and Liao (2011) and Chen, Chen and Wang (2012 WIP).

CSR

= Yes if 2011 is a year in which a firm issues a CSR report (CSR_PUBYR==1).
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Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Figure 1
Figure 1A:

US CSR Reports

Figure 1B:

Global CSR Reports

Figures 1A & B, above, indicate the number of stand-alone CSR reports
issued each year from 1993 to 2012 per data found at CorporateRegister.com
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Table 1
Variable Descriptions
Dependent Variables
CSR_YR1

= 1 in the first year t (initiating year) a public US firm issues a stand alone CSR report per
CorporateRegister.com; 0 in any non-initiating year t or for all non-CSR report issuers.
The control group (CSR_YR1=0) represents all years in which no CSR reports are issued.

CSR_PUBYR

= 1 for years in which a public US firm issues a CSR report per CorporateRegister.com;
0 otherwise.

Independent Variables
LP

= labor pressure, calculated as firm-level labor intensity interacted with the industry
unionization rate. Labor intensity is Compustat EMP scaled by AT for each firm (Hilary,
2006) and unionization rate data comes from the Union Membership and Coverage
Database at unionstats.com (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003).

LP_RISK

= indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in a three-digit NAICS industry at higher risk
for child labor or forced labor per the United States Department of Labor and
International Labor Affairs Bureau's List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or
Forced Labor ; 0 otherwise.
= leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total assets.

LEV
LEV * LP
ADV_INT

= the interaction between the leverage ratio and labor pressure.
= the advertising intensity for the three-digit NAICS industry for the year; defined as the
ratio of annual advertising expense divided by average total assets.

SIZEMVE

= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year following Dhaliwal et al. (2011)
and Lang and Ludholm (1993). Measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of
common equity (PRCC_F * CSHO) at the beginning of each year.

REG

= indicator variable that equals 1 if the two-digit SIC code industry is considered regulated
per Weiss and Klass (1986) and Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010); 0 otherwise.
= indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income (Compustat
PIFO); 0 otherwise.
= percentage of firms issuing CSR reports in year t per three-digit NAICS industry codes.
CSR reports are identified via CorporateRegister.com.
= Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1. I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
by summing the squares of the market shares of the 50 largest companies in a three-digit
NAICS industry. I then calculate a firm's market share by dividing the sales (SALE) of a
firm in year t by the total sales of all the 50 largest companies in a three-digit NAICS
code industry in that year. In cases where there are fewer than 50 companies in an
industry, I use all companies in that industry to calculate the market share of each firm.

GLOBAL
PCT_CSR
COMPETITION

ROA

= total return on assets per firm year measured as income before extraordinary items (IB)
divided by total assets (AT) at the beginning of year t .

TOBINQ

= Tobin's Q, measured as the market value of common equity plus the book value of
preferred stock (PSTKL), book value of long-term debt (DLTT) and current liability
(LCT), scaled by the book value of total assets.

LITRISK

= 1 if SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise. Per Dhaliwal et al. (2011) highlitigation industries include SIC codes of: 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961
and 7370.
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Table 2
Sample Details
Panel A: Sample Determination
Full Sample
121,584
18,776

All Compustat Observations (2002 - 2012 )
Firms
Drop observations with missing:
Total Assets (AT)
Mkt. Value Equity (SIZEMVE)
Growth (TOBINQ)
Employees (EMP )
Labor Pressure (LP )
Profitability (ROA )
Sample Observations (N )
Sample Firms ( n )

19,699
19,467
15,994
7,134
6,979
354
51,957
8,720

Panel B: CSR Report Data for Public Firms

Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Full
Sample
5,226
4,872
4,978
4,885
4,874
4,719
4,681
4,664
4,506
4,303
4,249

US CSR Reports
CR.com2
109
116
134
161
177
210
250
299
381
402
400

Obs. (N )
Firms (n )

51,957
8,720

2,639
494

Final CSR Report Sample
CSR Firms Initiators
GRI Used
79
18
2
3%
65
15
8 12%
90
17
16 18%
101
25
27 27%
116
23
38 33%
135
25
40 30%
167
37
57 34%
198
55
73 37%
265
65
97 37%
284
42
120 42%
288
25
143 50%
1,788
454

347
347

621
206

1 Represents the number of publicly traded firms issuing US stand-alone CSR reports per CorporateRegister.com.
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Table 2
Sample Details - Continued

Panel C: Industry Details
Two-Digit NAICS Industry Sectors
CSR Reporting Sample:
11
21
22
23
31
32
33
42
44
45
48
49
51
52
53
54
56
61
62
72

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 1
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Retail Trade
Transportation and Warehousing
Transportation and Warehousing
Information
Finance and Insurance
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services
Educational Services
Health Care and Social Assistance
Accommodation and Food Services

CSR
Initiation

CSR
Reports

0
23
19
4
27
49
96
7
17
8
14
1
28
11
5
13
8
1
6
10
347

8
131
48
17
139
407
497
26
67
39
62
18
132
39
14
51
24
6
17
46
1,788

Non-CSR Reporting Sectors
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
81 Other Services (except Public Administration)
92 Public Administration
1 The Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting NAICS classification (11) contains three firms that issued CSR reports in the 2002 to
2012 sample period, but issued their first (initiation) CSR report prior to 2002.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Panel A: Statistics for Non-CSR Issuing Observations vs. CSR Issuing Observations
Full Sample

LP
LEV
ADV_INT
SIZEMVE
REG
GLOBAL
PCT_CSR
COMPETITION
ROA
TOBINQ
LITRISK

Mean
0.0007
0.3022
0.0115
5.1292
0.2182
0.2930
0.0252
-0.0751
-0.3067
3.5520
0.5479

Median
0.0002
0.1572
0.0085
5.2047
0.0000
0.0000
0.0173
-0.0583
0.0175
1.4860
1.0000

N
n

SD
0.0109
0.6397
0.0135
2.3676
0.4131
0.4551
0.0286
0.0718
1.4532
8.8719
0.4977

Non-CSR Initiation Obs

CSR Initiation Obs

CSR_YR1 = 0

CSR_YR1 = 1

Mean
0.0007
0.3026
0.0115
5.1053
0.2177
0.2903
0.0250
-0.0751
-0.3093
3.5650
0.5484

Median
0.0002
0.1561
0.0085
5.1847
0.0000
0.0000
0.0173
-0.0583
0.0171
1.4870
1.0000

49,894
8,602

SD
0.0109
0.6417
0.0135
2.3560
0.4127
0.4539
0.0283
0.0717
1.4579
8.9012
0.4977

Mean
0.0004
0.2517
0.0125
8.5378
0.2939
0.6772
0.0559
-0.0808
0.0639
1.6908
0.4640

49,547
8,584

Median
0.0002
0.2320
0.0081
8.5620
0.0000
1.0000
0.0426
-0.0610
0.0579
1.3653
0.0000

SD
0.0006
0.1672
0.0168
1.3203
0.4562
0.4682
0.0469
0.0760
0.0839
1.0178
0.4994

Mean
Diff
t-value
-5.2607
-5.3914
1.0493
47.8964
3.1039
15.3435
12.2826
-1.3871
46.9453
-27.6799
-3.1398

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

347
347

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_YR1
LP
LEV
ADV_INT
SIZEM VE
REG

=
=
=
=
=
=

1 for CSR initiation year; 0 otherwise.
labor pressure.
leverage ratio.
advertising intensity.
size using the market value of equity.
1 if the industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.

GLOBAL
PCT_CSR
COM PETITION
ROA
TOBINQ
LITRISK

=
=
=
=
=
=

1 if reporting non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
percentage of CSR reports industry year.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
total return on assets per firm year.
Tobin's Q.
1 if industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Indicate the difference between means is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 3 - Continued
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Panel B: Pearson (bottom)/Spearman Correlation

CSR_YR1
LP
LEV
ADV_INT
SIZEMVE
REG
GLOBAL
PCT_CSR
COMP.
ROA
TOBINQ
LITRISK

CSR_YR1

LP

1
-0.002
-0.007
0.006
0.121
0.015
0.071
0.090
-0.007
0.021
-0.018
-0.014

0.004
1
0.077
-0.007
-0.039
0.020
-0.016
0.004
-0.012
-0.059
0.136
-0.029

LEV ADV_INT SIZEMVE REG GLOBAL PCT_CSR COMP. ROA TOBINQ LITRISK
0.027
0.190
1
-0.023
-0.211
0.026
-0.104
-0.006
0.005
-0.448
0.557
-0.035

-0.007
-0.018
-0.102
1
-0.008
-0.218
-0.007
0.083
-0.122
0.004
0.006
0.248

0.115
-0.123
0.030
-0.040
1
0.127
0.282
0.113
-0.021
0.286
-0.214
-0.091

0.015
-0.014
0.165
-0.406
0.123
1
-0.180
0.071
-0.113
0.037
-0.051
-0.582

0.071
-0.027
-0.057
0.038
0.293
-0.180
1
0.052
0.082
0.130
-0.118
0.136

0.075
0.048
-0.015
0.078
0.093
0.017
0.092
1
-0.031
0.016
-0.033
-0.047

-0.007
-0.032
-0.119
0.241
-0.058
-0.209
0.108
0.192
1
-0.043
0.035
0.289

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_YR1
LP
LEV
ADV_INT
SIZEMVE
REG
GLOBAL
PCT _CSR
COMP.
ROA
T OBINQ
LIT RISK

= 1 if t is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
= labor pressure.
= leverage ratio.
= advertising intensity.
= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
= 1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.
= 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
= percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
= COMPET IT ION: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
= total return on assets per firm year.
= T obin's Q.
= 1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
A correlation coefficient in bold indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level.
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0.049
0.031
-0.126
-0.059
0.409
0.054
0.152
0.003
-0.139
1
-0.604
-0.070

-0.013
-0.096
-0.102
0.148
-0.011
-0.106
-0.055
-0.036
0.127
-0.022
1
0.084

-0.014
-0.199
-0.235
0.493
-0.094
-0.582
0.136
0.078
0.435
-0.123
0.219
1

Table 4
Determinants of CSR Initiation

Variables
LPt-1

CSR Initiation (I)

With Interaction (II)

Excluding Utilities (III)

Environmental (IV)

Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Sign
+

Coef.
12.414

LEVt-1

+

0.786

LEVt-1 * LPt-1

+

ADV_INTt-1

+

SIZEMVEt-1
REGt-1

SE
Prob.
2.755 0.000 ***
0.183

55.942 22.228

0.000 ***
0.012 **

Coef.
12.387

SE
Prob.
2.755 0.000 ***

0.785

0.183

0.000 ***

2.500

0.693

0.000 ***

55.943 22.228

Coef.
12.530

0.012 **

SE
Prob.
2.781 0.000 ***

0.827

0.181

0.000 ***

2.508

0.694

0.000 ***

55.715 22.279

0.012 **

+

0.644

0.029

0.000 ***

0.644

0.029

0.000 ***

0.651

0.030

0.000 ***

+/-

0.040

0.532

0.940

0.040

0.532

0.939

0.038

0.537

0.944

Coef.
11.258

SE
Prob.
3.292 0.001 ***

1.262

0.232

0.000 ***

2.122

0.814

0.009 ***

57.452 32.964

0.081 *

0.565

0.034

0.000 ***

-0.198

0.636

0.756

GLOBALt-1

+

0.864

0.138

0.000 ***

0.864

0.138

0.000 ***

0.891

0.141

0.000 ***

1.018

0.178

0.000 ***

PCT_CSRt-1

+

26.462

3.459

0.000 ***

26.463

3.459

0.000 ***

26.910

3.669

0.000 ***

27.765

4.619

0.000 ***

COMPETITION t-1

+

3.177

3.432

0.355

3.177

3.432

0.355

3.112

3.431

0.364

-0.925

4.332

0.831

ROAt-1

+

1.860

0.527

0.000 ***

1.861

0.527

0.000 ***

1.846

0.537

0.001 ***

2.209

0.649

0.001 ***

TOBINQ t-1

-

-0.296

0.071

0.000 ***

-0.296

0.071

0.000 ***

-0.297

0.072

0.000 ***

-0.280

0.083

0.001 ***

LITRISK t-1

+/-

-0.259

0.304

0.393

-0.259

0.304

0.393

-0.260

0.305

0.394

-0.215

0.590

0.716

Year Indicators
Industry Indicators
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. CSR_YR1 = 1)

Yes
Yes
0.2467
-1,551
48,397
347

Yes
Yes
0.2467
-1,551
48,397
347

Yes
Yes
0.2481
-1,493
47,781
333

Yes
Yes
0.2284
-981
29,440
215

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_YR1
LPt-1
LEVt-1
LEVt-1 * LPt-1
ADV_INT t-1
SIZEM VEt-1
REGt-1

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

1 if t is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
labor pressure.
leverage ratio.
the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.
advertising intensity.
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.

GLOBALt-1
PCT_CSRt-1
COM PETITION t-1
ROAt-1
TOBINQ t-1
LITRISK t-1

=
=
=
=
=
=

1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
total return on assets per firm year.
Tobin's Q.
1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
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Table 5
Determinants of CSR Initiation - Partitioned by Labor Pressure
Lower LP (I)1
Coef.
SE
z
Prob.
0.295 0.371 0.790 0.427

Higher LP (II)1
Coef.
SE
z
Prob.
1.171 0.277 4.230 0.000 ***

84.120 44.490

51.848 24.919

CSR_YR1 =
LEVt-1

Sign
+

ADV_INTt-1

+

SIZEMVEt-1

+

0.701

0.047 14.870

0.000 ***

0.618

0.038 16.070

0.000 ***

+/-

-0.222

0.938 -0.240

0.813

0.056

0.629

0.090

0.929

GLOBALt-1

+

1.116

0.240

4.650

0.000 ***

0.681

0.177

3.860

0.000 ***

PCT_CSRt-1

+

24.746

8.372

2.960

0.003 ***

27.854

4.473

6.230

0.000 ***

COMPETITION t-1

+

-1.217

5.606 -0.220

0.828

8.007

5.286

1.510

0.130

ROAt-1

+

1.338

0.586

2.290

0.022 **

2.051

0.914

2.240

0.025 **

TOBINQt-1

-

-0.198

0.093 -2.140

0.032 **

-0.375

0.105 -3.560

0.000 ***

LITRISK t-1

+/-

-0.535

0.393 -1.360

0.173

-0.018

0.657 -0.030

0.978

REGt-1

1.890

Year Indicators
Industry Indicators
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. CSR_YR1 = 1)

0.059 *

Yes
Yes
0.2784
-622
24,423
140

Difference in Lower/Higher LEVt-1 Coef. (Prob. ) 2

2.080

0.037 **

Yes
Yes
0.2312
-909
23,201
207

0.098 *

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
LP t-1

= labor pressure.

LEVt-1

= leverage ratio.

ADV_INT t-1

= advertising intensity.

SIZEM VEt-1

= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.

REG t-1

= 1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.

GLOBALt-1

= 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.

PCT_CSRt-1

= percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.

COM PETITION t-1

= Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.

ROA t-1

= total return on assets per firm year.

TOBINQ t-1

= Tobin's Q.

LITRISK t-1

= 1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

1

The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP
are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".

2

Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEVt-1 from (I) and (II) are statistically different at the 10% level.

Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, *
Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in
all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
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Table 6
Logit Model Estimating Odds Ratios

Variables
LPt-1

Sign
+

CSR Initiation Sample

Lower LP (I)1

Higher LP (II)1

Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1

Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1

Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1

Odds Ratio
239,598

SE
660,153

z
Prob.
4.500 0.000 +

LEVt-1

+

2.193

0.402 4.290

0.000 +

LEVt-1 * LPt-1

+

12.179

8.435 3.610

0.000 +

ADV_INTt-1

+

> 1 Bil.

2.520

SIZEMVEt-1

+

1.905

0.056 22.030

REGt-1

> 1 Bil.

Odds Ratio

SE

z

Prob.

Odds Ratio

SE

z

1.343

0.498 0.790

0.012 +

> 1 Bil.

> 1 Bil. 1.890

0.059 +

> 1 Bil.

0.000 +

2.016

0.095 14.870

0.000 +

1.855

0.071 16.070

0.427

3.227

0.894

Prob.

4.230 0.000 +

> 1 Bil. 2.080 0.037 +
0.000 +

+/-

1.041

0.554 0.080

0.939

0.801

0.752 -0.240

0.813

1.058

0.666

0.090 0.929

GLOBALt-1

+

2.373

0.328 6.250

0.000 +

3.054

0.733 4.650

0.000 +

1.977

0.349

3.860 0.000 +

PCT_CSRt-1

+

> 1 Bil.

> 1 Bil.

0.000 +

> 1 Bil.

> 1 Bil. 2.960

0.003 +

> 1 Bil.

> 1 Bil. 6.230 0.000 +

COMPETITION t-1

+

23.977

82.289 0.930

0.355

0.296

1.660 -0.220

0.828

3,002

15,866

ROAt-1

+

6.428

3.388 3.530

0.000 +

3.811

2.232 2.290

0.022 +

7.779

7.112

TOBINQ t-1

-

0.744

0.053 -4.170

0.000 -

0.820

0.076 -2.140

0.032 -

0.687

0.072 -3.560

0.000 -

LITRISK t-1

+/-

0.771

0.234 -0.850

0.393

0.586

0.230 -1.360

0.173

0.982

0.646 -0.030

0.978

7.650

Indicators2
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. CSR_YR1 = 1)

Yes
0.2467
-1,551
48,397
347

1.510

Yes
0.2784
-622
24,423
140

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_YR1

= 1 if t is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.

REG t-1

= 1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.

LP t-1

= labor pressure.

GLOBALt-1

= 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.

LEVt-1

= leverage ratio.

PCT_CSRt-1

= percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.

LEVt-1 * LP t-1

= the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.

COM PETITION t-1

= Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.

ADV_INT t-1

= advertising intensity.

ROA t-1

= total return on assets per firm year.

SIZEM VEt-1

= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.

TOBINQ t-1

= Tobin's Q.
= 1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

LITRISK t-1
1

The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".

2

The estimation includes both year and indisutry (three-digit NAICS) indicator variables.

Note: This table presents logistic regression results reporting odds ratios where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All tstatistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure. + (-) Indicate the variable has a significant influence on the dependent variable and the odds of CSR initiation increases (decreases) if the odds ratio for the
independent variable is greater than 1 (less than 1).
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0.13

2.240 0.025 +

Yes
0.2312
-909
23,201
207

Table 7
CSR Report Initiation Sample Sensitivity
(I)
CSR Initiation
No Lag

(II)
CSR Initiation
Drop Firms Post-CSR Initiation

Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1

Variables
LPt-1

Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1

(III)
CSR Initiation
Drop Consistent CSR Reporters Only
Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1

Sign
+

Coef. SE
z
Prob.
10.744 2.654 4.050 0.000 ***

Coef.
14.843

SE
z
Prob.
2.801 5.300 0.000 ***

Coef.
SE
12.498 2.787

z
Prob.
4.480 0.000 ***

LEVt-1

+

0.833 0.171 4.860 0.000 ***

0.851

0.184 4.620 0.000 ***

0.825 0.184

4.490 0.000 ***

LEVt-1 * LPt-1

+

2.327 0.940 2.470 0.013 **

2.993

0.739 4.050 0.000 ***

2.536 0.704

3.600 0.000 ***

ADV_INTt-1

+

52.641 22.199 2.370 0.018 **

56.234 22.586

2.490 0.013 **

SIZEMVEt-1

+

REGt-1

+/-

0.669 0.028 24.020 0.000 ***
-0.005 0.532 -0.010 0.992

48.969 20.669 2.370 0.018 **
0.886

0.037 23.770 0.000 ***

0.721 0.031 22.900 0.000 ***

0.371

0.503 0.740 0.460

0.064 0.525

0.120 0.903

GLOBALt-1

+

0.832 0.139 5.990 0.000 ***

1.231

0.137 8.990 0.000 ***

0.930 0.136

6.850 0.000 ***

PCT_CSRt-1

+

26.655 3.486 7.650 0.000 ***

28.576

3.326 8.590 0.000 ***

27.350 3.463

7.900 0.000 ***

COMPETITION t-1

+

ROAt-1

+

TOBINQ t-1

-

LITRISKt-1

+/-

5.432 3.640 1.490 0.136
0.257 0.304 0.850 0.398

2.443

3.431 0.710 0.476

2.727 3.514

0.780 0.438

1.796 0.548

3.280 0.001 ***

1.842

0.602 3.060 0.002 ***

-0.241 0.065 -3.680 0.000 ***

-0.344

0.072 -4.770 0.000 ***

-0.299 0.071 -4.210 0.000 ***

-0.296 0.306 -0.970 0.333

-0.335

0.322 -1.040 0.298

-0.264 0.306 -0.860 0.388

Yes
Yes
0.3174
-1,395
46,393
347

Yes
Yes
0.2696
-1,500
47,635
347

Year Indicators
Industry Indicators
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. CSR_YR1 = 1)

Yes
Yes
0.2443
-1,556
48,396
347

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_YR1
LPt-1

= 1 if t is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
= labor pressure.

REG t-1
GLOBALt-1

= 1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.
= 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.

LEVt-1

= leverage ratio.

PCT_CSRt-1

= percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.

LEVt-1 * LP t-1

= the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.

COM PETITION t-1

= Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.

ADV_INT t-1
SIZEM VEt-1

= advertising intensity.
= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.

ROA t-1
TOBINQ t-1

= total return on assets per firm year.
= Tobin's Q.
= 1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

LITRISK t-1

Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
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Table 8
Ongoing CSR Reporting
Lower LP (I)1

CSR Reporting Sample
Dependent Variable: CSR_PUBYR

Variables
LPt-1

Dependent Variable: CSR_PUBYR

Dependent Variable: CSR_PUBYR

Coef.

Coef.

Sign
+

Coef.
15.628

LEVt-1

+

0.696

0.141

4.920

0.000 ***

LEVt-1 * LPt-1

+

2.653

0.407

6.510

0.000 ***

ADV_INTt-1

+

12.984 12.170

1.070

0.286

SIZEMVEt-1

+

1.063

0.022 47.730

0.000 ***

1.205

0.037 32.530

REGt-1

SE
z
Prob.
1.493 10.470 0.000 ***

2.150

Higher LP (II)1

0.307

SE

z

Prob.

SE

z

Prob.

0.250

1.230

0.219

0.980

0.213

4.610

0.000 ***

35.694 22.837

1.560

0.118

3.506 15.225

0.230

0.818

0.000 ***

1.012

0.030 34.060

0.000 ***

+/-

0.584

0.271

0.031 **

-0.863

0.630 -1.370

0.170

0.856

0.324

2.640

0.008 ***

GLOBALt-1

+

1.500

0.075 19.880

0.000 ***

1.435

0.128 11.240

0.000 ***

1.498

0.095 15.720

0.000 ***

PCT_CSRt-1

+

20.908

1.494 13.990

0.000 ***

31.556

4.019

0.000 ***

19.426

1.734 11.200

0.000 ***

COMPETITION t-1

+

-1.426

1.960

-0.730

0.467

-2.006

3.286 -0.610

0.541

-0.540

2.949 -0.180

0.855

ROAt-1

+

0.787

0.262

3.010

0.003 ***

0.618

0.422

0.144

0.344

0.174

TOBINQ t-1

-

-0.365

0.036 -10.080

0.000 ***

-0.265

0.048 -5.550

0.000 ***

-0.447

0.055 -8.210

0.000 ***

LITRISKt-1

+/-

-0.226

0.178

0.205

-0.508

0.235 -2.160

0.031 **

-0.612

0.439 -1.390

0.164

-1.270

Year Indicators
Industry Indicators
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. CSR_PUBYR = 1)

Yes
Yes
0.4639
-4,117
49,033
1,788

7.850
1.460

0.467

1.360

Yes
Yes
0.5099
-1,569
24,669
140

Difference in Lower/Higher LEVt-1 Coef. (Prob. ) 2

Yes
Yes
0.4363
-2,488
23,931
207

0.002 ***

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_PUBYR

= 1 for years in which a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.

REGt-1

= 1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.

LPt-1
LEVt-1

= labor pressure.
= leverage ratio.

GLOBALt-1
PCT_CSRt-1

= 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
= percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.

LEVt-1 * LP t-1

= the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.

COM PETITION t-1 = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.

ADV_INT t-1
SIZEM VEt-1

= advertising intensity.
= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.

ROA t-1
TOBINQ t-1

= total return on assets per firm year.
= Tobin's Q.

LITRISK t-1

= 1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

1

The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".

2

Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEVt-1 from (I) and (II) are statistically different at the 1% level.

Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
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Table 9
Consistent and Non-Consistent CSR Reporting
CSR Initiation
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1
Consistent CSR
Non-Consistent CSR
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
18.557 *** 18.451 ***
8.304 ***
8.281 ***

LPt-1
LEVt-1

0.834 ***

LEVt-1 * LPt-1

0.833 ***

0.785 ***

0.785 ***

4.613 ***

ADV_INTt-1

36.262

36.269

SIZEMVEt-1

0.756 ***

0.756 ***

REGt-1

0.276

0.276

Ongoing CSR Reporting
Dep. Variable: CSR_PUBYR
Consistent CSR
Non-Consistent CSR
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
12.577 *** 12.540 ***
18.275 *** 18.239 ***
0.920 ***

1.356 *
81.450 **

81.448 **

0.708 ***
-0.044

0.919 ***

0.551 ***

1.770 ***
23.051

0.708 ***
-0.044

23.053

0.549 ***
3.319 ***

8.086

8.083

1.170 ***

1.170 ***

1.073 ***

1.073 ***

1.248 ***

1.248 ***

0.251

0.251

GLOBALt-1

1.182 ***

1.182 ***

0.897 ***

0.897 ***

1.946 ***

1.946 ***

1.550 ***

1.550 ***

PCT_CSRt-1

22.157 ***

22.159 ***

32.837 ***

32.838 ***

16.754 ***

16.755 ***

21.573 ***

21.575 ***

9.837 **

9.837 **

-4.693

-4.694

-2.942

-2.942

-0.415

-0.415

COMPETITION t-1
ROAt-1

3.134 ***

3.135 ***

1.060 **

1.061 **

0.581 *

0.582 *

0.898 ***

0.900 ***

TOBINQ t-1

-0.459 ***

-0.459 ***

-0.190 **

-0.190 **

-0.261 ***

-0.261 ***

-0.440 ***

-0.440 ***

LITRISK t-1

-0.218

-0.218

-0.308

-0.308

-0.158

-0.158

-0.238

-0.238

Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. = 1)

0.3027
-768
45,066
167

0.2571
-868
43,907
180

0.4948
-2,251
45,446
909

0.4329
-2,457
44,949
880

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_YR1
CSR_PUBYR
LPt-1
LEVt-1
LEVt-1 * LPt-1
ADV_INT t-1
SIZEM VEt-1

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

1 if t is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.

REGt-1
GLOBALt-1
PCT_CSRt-1
COM PETITION t-1
ROAt-1
TOBINQ t-1
LITRISK t-1

1 for years in which a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
labor pressure.
leverage ratio.
the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.
advertising intensity.
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.
1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
percentage of CSR reports per NAICS industry year.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
total return on assets per firm year.
Tobin's Q.
1 if the industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure. All models in
this table include year and NAICS industry fixed effects.
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Table 10
Additional Tests of Labor Pressure
(I)
High Risk LP
Variables
LPt-1

Sign
+

Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Coef.

Coef.
SE Prob.
12.414 2.755 0.000 ***

SE

Prob.

LP_RISK t-1

+

1.484 0.705 0.035 **

LEVt-1

+

0.783 0.183 0.000 ***

LEVt-1 * LPt-1

+

ADV_INTt-1

+

SIZEMVEt-1

+

REGt-1

(II)
Unionized LP

55.902 22.225 0.012 **

+/-

(III)
Including Interaction
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Coef. SE Prob.
12.387 2.755 0.000 ***

(IV)
Comprehensive LP
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1

Coef. SE Prob.
12.387 2.755 0.000 ***
1.491 0.705 0.034 **

0.786 0.183 0.000 ***
55.942 22.228 0.012 **

0.785 0.183 0.000 ***

0.785 0.183 0.000 ***

2.500 0.693 0.000 ***

2.500 0.693 0.000 ***

55.943 22.228 0.012 **

55.943 22.228 0.012 **

0.644 0.029 0.000 ***

0.644 0.029 0.000 ***

0.644 0.029 0.000 ***

0.644 0.029 0.000 ***

0.036 0.531 0.946

0.040 0.532 0.940

0.040 0.532 0.939

0.040 0.532 0.939

GLOBALt-1

+

0.864 0.138 0.000 ***

0.864 0.138 0.000 ***

0.864 0.138 0.000 ***

0.864 0.138 0.000 ***

PCT_CSRt-1

+

26.449 3.458 0.000 ***

26.462 3.459 0.000 ***

26.463 3.459 0.000 ***

26.463 3.459 0.000 ***

COMPETITION t-1

+

3.178 3.431 0.354

3.177 3.432 0.355

3.177 3.432 0.355

3.177 3.432 0.355

ROAt-1

+

1.854 0.526 0.000 ***

1.860 0.527 0.000 ***

1.861 0.527 0.000 ***

1.861 0.527 0.000 ***

TOBINQ t-1

-

-0.294 0.071 0.000 ***

-0.296 0.071 0.000 ***

-0.296 0.071 0.000 ***

-0.296 0.071 0.000 ***

LITRISK t-1

+/-

-0.260 0.304 0.391

-0.259 0.304 0.393

-0.259 0.304 0.393

-0.259 0.304 0.393

Yes
Yes
0.2466
-1,551
48,397
347

Yes
Yes
0.2467
-1,551
48,397
347

Yes
Yes
0.2467
-1,551
48,397
347

Yes
Yes
0.2467
-1,551
48,397
347

Year Indicators
Industry Indicators
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. CSR_YR1 = 1)
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
CSR_YR1

= 1 if t is the 1st year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.

REG t-1

= 1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.

LP t-1

= labor pressure.

GLOBALt-1

= 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.

LP_RISK t-1
LEVt-1

= 1 if the labor risk is higher for the industry; 0 otherwise.
= leverage ratio.

PCT_CSRt-1
COM PETITION t-1

= percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
= Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.

LEVt-1 * LP t-1

= the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.

ROA t-1

= total return on assets per firm year.

ADV_INT t-1
SIZEM VEt-1

= advertising intensity.
= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.

TOBINQ t-1
LITRISK t-1

= Tobin's Q.
= 1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
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Table 11
CSR Report Initiation: Partitioned by Labor Pressure and Excluding Distressed Firms

CSR_YR1 =
LEVt-1

Sign
+

ADV_INTt-1

+

SIZEMVEt-1
REGt-1

Lower LP (I)1
Coef.
SE
z
Prob.
0.336 0.494 0.680 0.495

Higher LP (II)1
Coef. SE
z
Prob.
2.052 0.611 3.360 0.001 ***

64.716 44.238

49.277 26.622

1.460 0.143

1.850

0.064 *

+

1.012

0.073 13.880

0.000 ***

0.953 0.071 13.510

0.000 ***

+/-

-4.601

0.614 -7.490

0.000 ***

0.916 0.795

1.150

0.249

1.065 0.230

GLOBALt-1

+

1.325

0.260 5.100 0.000 ***

4.620

0.000 ***

PCT_CSRt-1

+

32.286

9.543 3.380 0.001 ***

37.326

6.140

6.080

0.000 ***

COMPETITION t-1

+

3.512

5.917 0.590 0.553

13.773

8.441

1.630

0.103

ROAt-1

+

0.650

0.881 0.740 0.460

1.764 1.193

1.480

0.139

TOBINQt-1

-

-0.199

0.098 -2.030

0.043 **

-0.369

0.120 -3.070

0.002 ***

LITRISK t-1

+/-

-0.332

0.517 -0.640

0.521

-0.183

0.913 -0.200

0.841

Year Indicators
Industry Indicators
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var. CSR_YR1 = 1)

Difference in Lower/Higher LEVt-1 Coef. (Prob. )

Yes
Yes
0.3247
-437
13,355
112
2

Yes
Yes
0.3183
-522
13,070
138

0.017 **

For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
LP t-1

= labor pressure.

LEVt-1

= leverage ratio.

ADV_INT t-1

= advertising intensity.

SIZEM VEt-1

= the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.

REG t-1

= 1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.

GLOBALt-1

= 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.

PCT_CSRt-1

= percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.

COM PETITION t-1

= Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.

ROA t-1

= total return on assets per firm year.

TOBINQ t-1

= Tobin's Q.

LITRISK t-1

= 1 if two-digit SIC industry k is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.

1

The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP
are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".

2

Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEVt-1 from (I) and (II) are statistically different at the 5% level.

Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Indicate the
estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All tstatistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
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